Swift CSP-Assessor Customer Security Programme Assessor Certification(CSPAC) Exam Practice Test

SwiftNet Security Officers (e.g., Local Security Officer [LSO] or Remote Security Officer [RSO]) are responsible for managing security functions in the SWIFT environment, such as configuring accesscontrols and managing PKI certificates. Authentication for online access to SwiftNet services (e.g., via the Alliance Web Platform) is a critical security measure. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: Via their PKI certificate

This is incorrect. While PKI certificates are used for authenticating and signing SWIFT messages or securing communications, they are not the primary method for authenticating security officers’ online access to SwiftNet management interfaces. PKI certificates are managed by the HSM and used by applications or users for message-level security, not for logging into administrative portals.

•Option B: Via their swift.com account and secure code card

This is correct. Online SwiftNet Security Officers are authenticated using a combination of their swift.com account (a username and password managed through SWIFT’s customer portal) and a secure code card (a physical or virtual token providing a one-time password or multi-factor authentication code). This two-factor authentication (2FA) method ensures robust access control, aligning with CSCF Control "6.1 Security Awareness" and SWIFT’s emphasis on multi-layered security. SWIFT documentation for the Alliance suite and SwiftNet confirms this authentication process for security officers accessing online tools.

•Option C: Via their swift.com account

This is incorrect. Relying solely on a swift.com account (username and password) is insufficient for authenticating security officers, as it lacks the additional security layer required for sensitive administrative access. SWIFT mandates multi-factor authentication, typically involving a secure code card, to comply with security standards.

Summary of Correct Answer:

Online SwiftNet Security Officers are authenticated via their swift.com account and secure code card (B), ensuring secure access to management functions.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024: Control 6.1 supports multi-factor authentication for security officers.

•SWIFT Alliance Security Documentation: Details the use of swift.com accounts and secure code cards for LSO/RSO authentication.

•SWIFT SwiftNet Guidelines: Confirms 2FA for online security officer access.

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This question determines the scope of the CSCF for a Treasury Management System (TMS) and an MQ server (customer connector) installed on the same machine.

Step 1: Understand CSCF Scope

TheCSCF v2024defines its scope as systems directly involved in Swift messaging, connectivity, or security (e.g., customer connectors, messaging interfaces), as perControl 1.1: Swift Environment Protection. Back-office systems, like TMS, are typically out of scope unless they directly process Swift messages.

Step 2: Analyze the Scenario

TMS Application: A Treasury Management System is a back-office application for financial management, not a Swift messaging component. TheCSCF v2024excludes back-office systems from mandatory scope unless they pose a direct risk to Swift components.

MQ Server (Customer Connector): This middleware server connects to a Service Bureau, facilitating Swift traffic, making it in scope perControl 1.1.

Hosting System: The machine hosting both applications is in scope only to the extent it supports the MQ server, not the TMS.

Step 3: Evaluate Each Option

A. The TMS application, the MQ server and hosting system are in the scope of the CSCF and must be placed in a secure zoneIncorrect. The TMS is out of scope, and the hosting system’s inclusion depends on the MQ server, not the TMS.Conclusion: Incorrect.

B. The TMS application, the MQ server and hosting system enters the scope of the CSCF advisory and should be placed in a secure zoneIncorrect. The CSCF advisory scope applies to best practices, not mandatory controls, and does not mandate a secure zone for out-of-scope TMS.Conclusion: Incorrect.

C. Only the MQ server application is in scope of the CSCF. The TMS application is considered as back-officeCorrect. The MQ server is a customer connector, in scope perControl 1.1, while the TMS is a back-office system, excluded from mandatory scope per theCSCF v2024Introduction.Conclusion: Correct.

D. The TMS application is the highest risk and must be secured appropriately. The MQ server should be secured on a best effort basisIncorrect. The MQ server, as a Swift component, has higher CSCF priority, while TMS risk is managed outside CSCF scope.Conclusion: Incorrect.

Step 4: Conclusion and Verification

The correct answer isC, as only the MQ server is in scope, and the TMS is a back-office system excluded from CSCF requirements.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 1.1: Swift Environment Protection, Introduction Section: Scope.

Swift CSP FAQ, Section: Back-Office Systems.

The CSCF defines the scope of environments for a SWIFT user CSP assessment, focusing on environments that handle live SWIFT transactions or are critical to operational continuity. The "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025" and "Independent Assessment Framework" provide guidance on scope. Let’s evaluate each option, assuming the environments are separated:

•Option A: SWIFT infrastructure (sometimes known as Live)

This is in scope. The live environment, where actual SWIFT transactions are processed (e.g., Alliance Access sending MT103 messages), is the primary focus of the CSCF. Controls like "1.1 SWIFTEnvironment Protection" and "2.1 Internal Data Transmission Security" apply directly to this environment.

•Option B: Development

This is not in scope. Development environments, used for building or testing applications before deployment, are typically out of scope if they are fully separated from live systems and do not process real SWIFT data. The "Independent Assessment Framework" excludes development environments unless they are integrated with live systems, which the question assumes is not the case.

•Option C: Disaster Recovery

This is in scope. Disaster Recovery (DR) environments are designed to take over in case of a failure in the live environment. Since they can process live SWIFT transactions during a failover, they must comply with CSCF controls (e.g., Control "1.1") to ensure continuity and security.

•Option D: Cold backup systems

This is in scope. Cold backup systems, while not actively processing transactions, are part of the SWIFT infrastructure’s resilience strategy. They must be secured to prevent compromise (e.g., CSCF Control "1.2 Physical Security") and are included in the assessment scope per the "Assessment template for Mandatory controls."

Summary of Correct Answer:

The Development environment (B) is not in scope for a SWIFT user CSP assessment if separated from live systems.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Excludes development environments from scope if separated.

•Independent Assessment Framework: Focuses on live, DR, and backup environments.

•Assessment template for Mandatory controls: Includes DR and backup systems in scope.

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The Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF), part of the SWIFT Customer Security Programme, aims to enhance the security of the SWIFT ecosystem by defining mandatory and advisory security controls for users. The three main objectives are explicitly outlined in the CSCF documentation and reflect a holistic approach to security. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: 1. Secure your environment, 2. Know and Limit Access, 3. Detect and Respond

This is correct. These three objectives align directly with the core principles of the CSCF:

oSecure your environment: This involves implementing controls to protect the SWIFT-related infrastructure (e.g., CSCF Control 1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection, 1.2 Physical Security) against unauthorized access and threats.

oKnow and Limit Access: This focuses on managing access controls and authentication (e.g., CSCF Control 2.2 External Transmission Security, 6.1 Security Awareness) to ensure only authorized personnel can interact with the SWIFT environment.

oDetect and Respond: This emphasizes monitoring and incident response (e.g., CSCF Control 4.1 Logging and 5.1 Operational Incident Response) to identify and mitigate security incidents. These objectives are explicitly stated in the "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025" and reinforced across related documents like the "CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025."

•Option B: 1. Restrict Internet Access and Protect Critical Systems from General IT Environment, 2. Reduce Attack Surface and Vulnerabilities, 3. Physically Secure the Environment

This is incorrect. While these are specific controls within the CSCF (e.g., Control 1.1, 2.3 System Hardening, 1.2), they are not the overarching objectives. They are implementation details rather than the high-level goals of the framework.

•Option C: 1. Secure and Protect, 2. Prevent and Detect, 3. Share and Prepare

This is incorrect. These terms are vague and do not match the official CSCF objectives. "Share and Prepare" is not a recognized objective, and the phrasing does not align with SWIFT documentation.

•Option D: 1. Raise pragmatically the security bar, 2. Maintain appropriate cyber-security hygiene, 3. React promptly

This is incorrect. While these concepts are related to security improvement, they are not the specific objectives outlined in the CSCF. The language is more general and lacks the structured focus of the official objectives.

Summary of Correct Answer:

The three main objectives of the CSCF are to Secure your environment, Know and Limit Access, and Detect and Respond (A), as defined in the framework’s core principles.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Outlines the three main objectives (Secure, Know and Limit, Detect and Respond).

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Aligns controls with these objectives.

•Independent Assessment Framework: Supports the assessment of these objectives.

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This question relates to Control 5.2 – Token Management in the CSCF, which outlines requirements for managing physical or software-based tokens used for authentication or cryptographic operations in the SWIFT environment. Let’s evaluate each option:

A. Similar to user accounts, individual assignment and ownership for accurate traceability and revocation in case of potential tampering, loss or in case of user role change

CSCF Control 5.2 mandates that tokens (e.g., HSM tokens or software tokens) be uniquely assigned to individuals to ensure traceability and accountability. This allows for revocation in cases of tampering, loss, or role changes, mirroring user account management principles under Control 5.1 – Logical Access Control.

This question pertains to Control 7.3 – Physical Security in the CSCF:

Step 1: Control 7.3 Overview

Control 7.3 focuses on “physically securing SWIFT-related systems and components” (e.g., servers, HSMs) within the user’s premises to prevent unauthorized access, tampering, or theft.

This question addresses the implementation requirements for CSCF security controls.

Step 1: Understand CSCF Compliance

TheCSCF v2024emphasizes achieving control objectives and mitigating risk drivers for in-scope components, allowing flexibility in implementation, as perControl Objectives Overview.

Step 2: Evaluate Each Option

A. A solution that maps the implementation guidelines described for a controls in scope componentsWhile implementation guidelines exist, strict adherence is not mandatory. TheCSCF v2024allows custom solutions if they meet objectives.Conclusion: Incorrect.

B. A solution that meets the control objectives and addresses the risk drivers for the in scope componentsTheCSCF v2024andSwift CSP FAQrequire solutions to align with control objectives (e.g., security, detection) and mitigate identified risks, offering flexibility in approach.Conclusion: Correct.

Step 3: Conclusion and Verification

The correct answer isB, as theCSCF v2024prioritizes meeting objectives and addressing risks over rigid guideline mapping.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Section: Control Objectives.

Swift CSP FAQ, Section: Implementation Flexibility.

This question assesses whether a short interview with the HR manager providing one example of security training implementation is acceptable for a small infrastructure with only two operators, under the Swift Customer Security Programme (CSP).

Step 1: Understand Security Training Requirements

TheSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, underControl 5.1: Security Training and Awareness, mandates that all personnel with access to Swift-related systems (including operators) receive regular, documented security training. This includes awareness of security policies, procedures, and incident response. The control applies regardless of the size of the infrastructure.

Step 2: Analyze the Scenario

The entity has a small infrastructure with two operators, and the HR manager provides a short interview with one example of security training implementation.

TheIndependent Assessment Frameworkrequires assessors to validate the effectiveness of controls, including evidence of training completion, content, frequency, and attendance records. A risk-based approach allows flexibility, but minimum evidence standards must still be met.

Step 3: Evaluate Against CSCF Guidelines

Control 5.1specifies that training must be documented, with evidence such as training logs, attendance records, or certification. A single interview with one example does not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate:

That all operators (both in this case) have been trained.

The frequency and comprehensiveness of the training program.

The effectiveness of the training (e.g., understanding and application).

TheSwift CSP FAQandSecurity Best Practicesnote that even for small entities, assessors must see multiple pieces of evidence (e.g., training schedules, materials, test results) to confirm compliance, especially during an independent assessment.

A risk-based testing approach (mentioned in option A) allows tailoring the depth of evidence based on risk, but it does not exempt small entities from providing more than a single anecdotal example. TheIndependent Assessment Frameworkrequires objective evidence, not just verbal assurances.

Step 4: Conclusion and Verification

The answer isB, as a short interview with one example is insufficient to meet the evidence requirements ofControl 5.1in theCSCF v2024. More evidence (e.g., training records, attendance logs, or test results) is required to validate compliance, even for a small infrastructure.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 5.1: Security Training and Awareness.

Swift Independent Assessment Framework, Section: Evidence Requirements.

Swift Security Best Practices, Section: Training Documentation.

Swift CSP FAQ, Section: Small Entity Compliance.

The SWIFT CSP requires an independent assessment to ensure compliance with the CSCF, as outlined in the "Independent Assessment Framework" and "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines." Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: Yes

This is incorrect. The CSP mandates that an independent assessor, not the user’s first line of defence, conducts the assessment to provide an unbiased evaluation. Relying solely on a self-assessment, even if detailed, does not meet the requirement for independence, as per the "Independent Assessment Framework."

•Option B: Yes, but only if the CISO signs the completion letter at the end of the assessment

This is incorrect. While the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) may sign the "CSCF Assessment Completion Letter" to acknowledge the assessment, this does not replace the need for independent testing. The signature is a formal step, but the assessor must still perform their own validation.

•Option C: No, even if it could support the compliance level, additional testing will always be required by the independent assessor to confirm a controls compliance level

This is correct. The "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines" requires assessors to conduct their own testing, even if the user provides a valid self-assessment. This ensures objectivity and verifies the effectiveness of controls (e.g., Control 1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection). The self-assessment can serve as supporting evidence, but additional testing is mandatory, as detailed in the "CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025."

•Option D: No, except if the SWIFT user’s chief auditor approves this approach

This is incorrect. Chief auditor approval does not override the CSP’s requirement for independent assessor testing. The assessment process is governed by SWIFT standards, not internal approvals.

Summary of Correct Answer:

An assessor cannot fully rely on the user’s self-assessment; additional testing is always required (C).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Independent Assessment Framework: Mandates independent assessor testing.

•Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines: Requires additional validation.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Outlines assessor testing requirements.

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This question addresses the use of ISAE 3000 reports in CSP assessments:

Step 1: ISAE 3000 in CSP Context

ISAE 3000 (International Standard on Assurance Engagements) reports provide assurance on controls but are not specifically tailored to SWIFT CSP requirements. The IAF allows their use as supporting evidence, not as a primary assessment substitute.

The High-Level Test Plan (HLTP) is outlined in the "Independent Assessment Framework - High-Level Test Plan Guidelines" and serves as a guidance document for assessors. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: The HLTP provides a way of testing and the typical evidence for each control (based on implementation guidelines) and must be strictly followed

This is incorrect. The HLTP is a recommended framework, not a strict mandate. Assessors have flexibility to adapt testing approaches based on the user’s environment, as per the "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines."

•Option B: The HLTP provides a way of testing and the typical evidence for each control (based on implementation guidelines), testing should be ideally based on it

This is correct. The HLTP offers a standardized methodology and evidence examples for testing CSCF controls, derived from implementation guidelines. The "CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025" encourages assessors to use it as a best practice, allowing adjustments as needed.

•Option C: The HLTP provides the rules to define the sample for testing

This is incorrect. While the HLTP includes sample size guidance (e.g., minimum of 3 for limited testing), its primary purpose is broader, covering testing methods and evidence, not just sampling rules.

•Option D: The HLTP provides a detailed way of control testing

This is incorrect. The HLTP is high-level, not detailed; detailed testing plans are developed by assessors based on the HLTP framework.

Summary of Correct Answer:

The HLTP provides testing methods and evidence, and testing should ideally be based on it (B).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Independent Assessment Framework - High-Level Test Plan Guidelines: Defines HLTP purpose.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Recommends HLTP usage.

•Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines: Allows flexibility.

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A Hardware Security Module (HSM) in the SWIFT context is a physical or virtual device used to manage cryptographic keys and perform security operations. Its purpose is critical to ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of SWIFT transactions. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: To encrypt the database of the messaging interface

This is incorrect. While HSMs can perform encryption, their primary role in the SWIFT ecosystem is not to encrypt databases of messaging interfaces (e.g., Alliance Access). Database encryption is typically handled by the institution’s own security measures or software, not the HSM. The CSCF focuses on HSMs for key management and message security, not database-level encryption (e.g., Control "1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection").

•Option B: To store PKI certificates

This is correct. The SWIFT HSM is used to securely store and manage Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates, which are essential for authentication, message signing, and encryption within the SWIFT network. SWIFT uses PKI for role-based access control and to secure communications over SWIFTNet. The HSM ensures that these certificates are protected against unauthorized access and tampering, aligning with CSCF Control "1.3 Cryptographic Failover." For example, in Alliance Gateway setups, the HSM stores SWIFTNet PKI certificates used for secure message transmission.

•Option C: To connect to the SWIFT Secure IP Network (SIPN)

This is incorrect. Connection to the SIPN is managed by components like SwiftNet Link (SNL) and VPN boxes, not the HSM. The HSM’s role is security-focused, handling cryptographic operations, not network connectivity. CSCF Control "1.1" specifies that connectivity is achieved through network components, while the HSM supports security within that environment.

•Option D: To format the FIN MT messages

This is incorrect. Message formatting (e.g., creating FIN MT messages like MT103) is handled by messaging interfaces like Alliance Access or Alliance Gateway, not the HSM. The HSM’s function is limited to cryptographic tasks, such as signing and verifying messages after they are formatted, as per CSCF Control "2.1 Internal Data Transmission Security."

Summary of Correct Answer:

The primary purpose of a SWIFT HSM is to store PKI certificates, ensuring secure cryptographic operations for SWIFT transactions.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024: Control 1.3 mandates the use of HSMs for cryptographic failover and certificate management.

•SWIFT Security Guidelines: HSMs are described as key management devices for PKI certificates in SWIFTNet communications.

•Alliance Gateway Documentation: Details the HSM’s role in storing and managing PKI certificates for secure message processing.

This question identifies the authentication methods supported by Alliance Interfaces (e.g., Alliance Access, Alliance Gateway) under theSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024.

Step 1: Understand Authentication on Alliance Interfaces

TheCSCF v2024, underControl 2.3: System Access Control, mandates strong authentication for access to Swift-related components, including Alliance Interfaces. TheSwift Alliance Gateway Technical DocumentationandAlliance Access User Guidedetail supported methods.

Step 2: Evaluate Each Option

A. PasswordAlliance Interfaces support basic password authentication as a standard method, as noted in theAlliance Access User Guide. While not the strongest alone, it is permitted with additional controls.Conclusion: Correct.

B. LDAP AuthenticationLDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) is supported for centralized authentication, integrating with enterprise directory services, per theSwift Security Best PracticesandControl 2.3.Conclusion: Correct.

C. Radius One-time passwordRADIUS with one-time passwords (OTP) is not a standard authentication method for Alliance Interfaces. TheAlliance Gateway Technical Documentationdoes not list RADIUS OTP as supported, focusing instead on password, LDAP, and TOTP.Conclusion: Incorrect.

D. Password and TOTPTime-based One-Time Password (TOTP) combined with password (multi-factor authentication) is supported for enhanced security, as required byControl 2.3and detailed in theSwift Security Best Practicesfor privileged access.Conclusion: Correct.

Step 3: Conclusion and Verification

The correct answers areA, B, and D, as these methods are supported by Alliance Interfaces, aligning withCSCF v2024and related documentation.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 2.3: System Access Control.

Swift Alliance Gateway Technical Documentation, Section: Authentication Methods.

Swift Security Best Practices, Section: Multi-Factor Authentication.

The "Swift Customer Security Controls Policy" and "Independent Assessment Framework" outline the consequences of non-compliance with the CSP. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: To be reported to their supervisors (if applicable)

This does not apply. Non-compliance is managed by SWIFT, not internal reporting to supervisors, unless specified by the user’s internal governance (not a CSP requirement).

•Option B: To be seen as non-compliant to their counterparts in KYC-SA

This applies. Non-compliance is reflected in the KYC-SA portal, where counterparties can view the user’s status, impacting trust and business relationships, as per the "Independent Assessment Framework."

•Option C: To be contacted by SWIFT to provide the CSP assessment report and detailed information about the reason of non-compliance

This applies. SWIFT engages with non-compliant users, requesting assessment reports and remediation plans, as outlined in the "Swift_CSP_Assessment_Report_Template" and "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines."

•Option D: To be delisted from the BIC directory

This does not apply. Delisting is an extreme measure not automatically triggered by non-compliance; it requires persistent failure to remediate after engagement, which is not guaranteed.

Summary of Correct Answers:

Possible impacts include being seen as non-compliant in KYC-SA (B) and being contacted by SWIFT for reports (C).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Independent Assessment Framework: Details non-compliance impacts.

•Swift_CSP_Assessment_Report_Template: Supports SWIFT follow-up.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Reflects KYC-SA visibility.

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The SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) defines the scope of components that must comply with its security controls, particularly those handling SWIFT-related data or connectivity. Let’s analyze the scenario:

•A Treasury Management System (TMS) application is a back-office system used to manage financial operations, such as payments or liquidity management. A customer connector is a custom application or integration layer that connects the user’s systems (e.g., TMS) to the SWIFT infrastructure, in this case via a Service Bureau. The hosting system is the physical or virtual machine on which both applications are installed.

•The TMS and customer connector are on the same machine, and the customer connector connects to a Service Bureau, which hosts the SWIFT communication infrastructure (e.g., Alliance Gateway).

•CSCF Scope: The "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025" and "CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree" define the scope as including:

oCustomer connectors: These are in scope because they facilitate SWIFT connectivity (e.g., sending/receiving SWIFT messages), even if connecting via a Service Bureau.

oSystems hosting in-scope components: The hosting system (machine) is in scope because it runs the customer connector, which is directly involved in SWIFT data flows.

oBack-office systems (e.g., TMS): Normally, back-office systems are out of scope unless they are closely integrated with SWIFT infrastructure. In this case, the TMS is installed on the same machine as the customer connector, creating a shared environment. The CSCF considers systems in the same environment as in-scope if they could impact the security of SWIFT-related components (e.g., Control "1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection").

•Service Bureau Context: Connecting to a Service Bureau (architecture type A2) does not exempt the local components from CSCF scope. The "Independent Assessment Framework" requires assessing all local components that interact with SWIFT, even if the communication layer is outsourced.

•Option A: The TMS application, the customer connector, and the hosting system are in the scope of the CSCF

This is correct. The customer connector is explicitly in scope as it handles SWIFT data flows. The hosting system is in scope because it runs the connector. The TMS, while typically a back-office system, is in scope because it shares the same machine, creating a risk of lateral movement or privilege escalation (e.g., CSCF Control "1.1"). The "CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025" includes shared environments in the assessment scope.

•Option B: Only the customer connector application is in scope of the CSCF. The TMS application is a back-office

This is incorrect. While the TMS is a back-office system, its co-location on the same machine as the customer connector brings it into scope due to shared risks, as per CSCF guidelines.

•Option C: The TMS application is the highest risk and must be secured appropriately. The customer connector should be secured on a best effort basis

This is incorrect. The CSCF does not prioritize the TMS as the "highest risk" nor suggest "best effort" security for the customer connector. Both components must be secured per mandatory controls when in scope.

•Option D: The TMS application, the customer connector, and the hosting system are in scope only if they connect directly to SWIFT, not towards a Service Bureau

This is incorrect. The CSCF scope includes components connecting via a Service Bureau, as they still handle SWIFT data and are part of the user’s architecture (e.g., A2).

Summary of Correct Answer:

The TMS application, customer connector, and hosting system are all in scope of the CSCF (A) due to their shared environment and connectivity to SWIFT via a Service Bureau.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Control 1.1 includes shared environments in scope.

•CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree: Classifies A2 for Service Bureau setups with local connectors.

•Independent Assessment Framework: Requires assessing all components in shared environments.

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This question addresses valid implementations ofControl 2.9: Transaction Business Controlsunder theSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, which focuses on detecting and preventing fraudulent transactions.

Step 1: Understand Control 2.9 Transaction Business Controls

Control 2.9 requires Swift users to implement measures to validate transaction flows against expected business patterns, aiming to detect anomalies that could indicate fraud or error. TheCSCF v2024emphasizes flexibility in implementation, provided the controls mitigate identified risks effectively.

Step 2: Evaluate Each Option

A. Multiple measures must be implemented by the Swift user to validate the flows of transactions are in the bounds of the normal expected businessTheCSCF v2024, underControl 2.9, mandates the use of multiple detection measures (e.g., transaction monitoring, threshold limits, anomaly detection) to ensure transaction flows align with normal business expectations. This multi-layered approach is essential to address diverse fraud risks.Conclusion: This is correct.

B. A customer designed implementation or a combination of different measures are deemed valid if they sufficiently mitigate the control risksTheCSCF v2024allows flexibility in how users implement Control 2.9, permitting custom solutions or combinations of measures (e.g., AI-based monitoring, manual reviews) as long as they effectively mitigate the risks identified in the user’s risk assessment. This is supported by theSwift CSP FAQon control customization.Conclusion: This is correct.

C. Reliance on a recent business assessment or regulator response confirming the effectiveness of the control (as an example CPMI's requirement) is especially poignant to this controlWhile a business assessment or regulator input (e.g., CPMI-IOSCO guidelines) can inform the implementation, Control 2.9 requires the user to implement specific measures, not just rely on external validations. TheCSCF v2024does not allow sole dependence on such assessments; users must demonstrate their own controls.Conclusion: This is incorrect.

D. Any solution is acceptable so long as the CISO approves the implementationTheCSCF v2024requires that implementations meet objective criteria for risk mitigation, not just internal approval by the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO). The independent assessment must validate effectiveness, not just rely on CISO endorsement.Conclusion: This is incorrect.

Step 3: Conclusion and Verification

The verified answers areAandB, as they align with the requirements and flexibility ofControl 2.9 Transaction Business Controlsin theCSCF v2024, ensuring robust and tailored transaction validation.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 2.9: Transaction Business Controls.

Swift CSP FAQ, Section: Control Implementation Flexibility.

Swift Security Best Practices, Section: Transaction Monitoring.

This question explores the process for updating an attestation after remediating an exception identified by an assessor:

Step 1: CSP Attestation and Remediation Process

The SWIFT CSP requires users to submit an annual attestation via the KYC Security Attestation (KYC-SA) application, reflecting compliance with CSCF controls. If anexception (non-compliance) is reported, remediation must occur, followed by validation before updating the attestation.

CSCF Control "4.2 Intrusion Detection" requires SWIFT users to detect unauthorized access or activities within the SWIFT environment. The "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025" allows flexibility in meeting this control using various technologies. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: NIDS (Network Intrusion Detection System)

This is valid. NIDS monitors network traffic to detect intrusions (e.g., on VPN boxes), aligning with Control "4.2" by identifying external threats.

•Option B: HIDS (Host Intrusion Detection System)

This is valid. HIDS monitors individual hosts (e.g., servers running Alliance Access) for suspicious activities, supporting Control "4.2" for internal threat detection.

•Option C: EDR and XDR (Endpoint Detection and Response, Extended Detection and Response)

This is valid. EDR and XDR provide advanced monitoring and response capabilities for endpoints and across environments, meeting Control "4.2" requirements for detecting and responding to intrusions.

•Option D: A combination of all of the above

This is correct. The CSCF encourages a layered security approach, and the "CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025" and "Assessment template for Mandatory controls" accept a combination of NIDS, HIDS, EDR, and XDR to comprehensively meet Control "4.2," depending on the architecture and risk profile.

Summary of Correct Answer:

Intrusion Detection Control can be met through a combination of NIDS, HIDS, EDR, and XDR (D).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Control 4.2 allows multiple detection technologies.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Supports combined approaches.

•Assessment template for Mandatory controls: Includes various intrusion detection methods.

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The Hardware Security Module (HSM) Box is a critical component for managing cryptographic keys in the SWIFT environment. Hardening at the system level involves securing the HSM’s operating system and configuration against vulnerabilities. Let’s evaluate:

•CSCF Control "2.3 System Hardening" mandates that all SWIFT-related systems, including the HSM Box, be hardened to reduce the attack surface. This is the responsibility of the SWIFT user owning the equipment, as outlined in the "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025."

•The "Assessment template for Mandatory controls" requires users to demonstrate hardening of owned HSMs, including patching, disabling unused services, and enforcing access controls.

•If the HSM is owned by the user (e.g., in an on-premises A1 or A2 architecture), the user must perform hardening. This differs from cloud deployments (e.g., A4), where the provider may handle it, but the question specifies user-owned equipment.

Summary of Correct Answer:

The SWIFT user owning the HSM Box must harden it at the system level (TRUE).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Control 2.3 requires system hardening.

•Assessment template for Mandatory controls: Specifies user responsibility for owned HSMs.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Includes HSM hardening in assessments.

The "Independent Assessment Framework" and "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines" govern the frequency and reliance on previous assessments. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: Yes, full reliance can be provided without the need of an independent assessment if nothing has changed

This is incorrect. The CSP requires an annual independent assessment, even if no changes occur, to verify ongoing compliance, as per the "Independent Assessment Framework."

•Option B: No, even if nothing has changed, an independent assessor needs to assess the conditions before being able to rely on the previous year’s assessment

This is correct. While the previous report can be used as a baseline, the assessor must perform a review (e.g., walkthroughs, spot checks) to confirm no changes or degradation in compliance, as outlined in the "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines" and "CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025."

•Option C: No, even if nothing has changed, an independent assessor needs to perform a full assessment including full testing every year

This is incorrect. A full assessment is not always required; a review of conditions can suffice if no changes are identified, per CSP guidelines.

•Option D: Yes, full reliance can be provided if the CISO of the SWIFT user signs a letter which confirms that nothing has changed

This is incorrect. CISO confirmation does not replace the assessor’s independent review, as mandated by the "Independent Assessment Framework."

Summary of Correct Answer:

An assessor cannot rely fully on a previous report without assessing conditions (B).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines: Requires annual review.

•Independent Assessment Framework: Mandates assessor validation.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Supports conditional reliance.

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This question addresses the scope of penetration testing for Swift-related components under theSwift Customer Security Programme (CSP).

Step 1: Understand Penetration Testing Requirements

TheCSCF v2024, underControl 4.1: Penetration Testing, mandates penetration testing to identify vulnerabilities in Swift-related systems. The scope is defined by theSwift Testing Policy, not arbitrarily applied to all components.

Step 2: Analyze the Statement

The statement suggests that penetration testing "must be performed at application level against the Swift-related components, such as the interfaces, Swift and customer connectors." We need to verify if this is a mandatory scope.

Step 3: Evaluate Against Swift Guidelines

Control 4.1: Penetration Testingrequires testing of in-scope components, but theSwift Testing Policy(referenced in theCSCF v2024andSecurity Best Practices) specifies which components (e.g., messaging interfaces, connectors) must be tested based on risk and architecture.

The policy does not mandate testing all listed components (e.g., interfaces, connectors) at the application level unless they are identified as high-risk or in-scope per the user’s assessment. For example, customer connectors might be excluded if managed by a Service Bureau, per theSwift Outsourcing Guidelines.

The statement’s assertion of a broad mandate is incorrect; the scope is limited to components defined in theSwift Testing Policy, which provides a tailored approach.

Step 4: Conclusion and Verification

The answer isB, as penetration testing must follow theSwift Testing Policy, which defines the specific components to test, rather than mandating all Swift-related components like interfaces and connectors.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 4.1: Penetration Testing.

Swift Testing Policy, Section: Scope Definition.

Swift Security Best Practices, Section: Penetration Testing.

SWIFT Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates are cryptographic credentials used to secure communications over the SWIFT network. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: Asymmetric signing and encryption end to end

This is correct. SWIFT PKI certificates utilize asymmetric cryptography (public and private key pairs) for both signing and encryption. Signing ensures the authenticity and integrity of messages (e.g., verifying the sender), while encryption provides confidentiality end to end—from the sender’s environment to the receiver’s environment across the SWIFT network. This end-to-end security is achieved using PKI certificates managed by Hardware Security Modules (HSMs), as mandated by CSCF Control "1.3 Cryptographic Failover." SWIFT documentation confirms that PKI supports full message security throughout the transmission process.

•Option B: Asymmetric signing and encryption end to SWIFT only

This is incorrect. The security provided by PKI certificates extends beyond just the connection to SWIFT (e.g., to the SWIFT Secure IP Network). It covers the entire message journey, including the recipient’s environment, ensuring end-to-end protection rather than stopping at SWIFT’s boundary.

•Option C: Symmetric encryption only

This is incorrect. SWIFT PKI relies on asymmetric cryptography for key exchange and signing, not symmetric encryption alone. While symmetric encryption may be used internally (e.g., for session keys derived from asymmetric key exchange), the PKI certificates themselves are based on asymmetric algorithms (e.g., RSA), as outlined in SWIFT’s security guidelines.

•Option D: Asymmetric signing only

This is incorrect. PKI certificates are used for both asymmetric signing (for authenticity and integrity) and encryption (for confidentiality), not just signing. The dual purpose is essential for the secure transmission of SWIFT messages.

Summary of Correct Answer:

SWIFT PKI certificates are used for asymmetric signing and encryption end to end (A), ensuring comprehensive security.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024: Control 1.3 specifies the use of PKI for end-to-end security.

•SWIFT Security Guidelines: Details PKI usage for asymmetric signing and encryption.

•SWIFT PKI Documentation: Confirms end-to-end cryptographic protection using PKI certificates.

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Alliance Lite2 is a cloud-based solution for smaller institutions, providing a lightweight interface to the SWIFT network. The messaging operator in Alliance Lite2 is a role responsible for managing message-related activities, typically through the Alliance Lite2 Business Application (L2BA) interface. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: Can create and modify messages

This is correct. The primary role of a messaging operator in Alliance Lite2 is to create and modify SWIFT messages, such as payment instructions (e.g., MT103) or other FIN messages. This is a core function of the L2BA interface, which provides a browser-based platform for operators to input, edit, and send messages. SWIFT documentation for Alliance Lite2 confirms that messaging operators have the necessary permissions to perform these tasks, aligning with the operational workflows supported by the platform.

•Option B: Can assign RBAC roles to RMA operators and messaging operators

This is incorrect. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) role assignment in Alliance Lite2 is typically managed by a security officer or administrator role, not the messaging operator. The messaging operator’s scope is limited to message-related activities, not user or role management. In Alliance Lite2, RBAC is managed through the Alliance Web Platform, where a security officer (e.g., LSO) assigns roles to operators, including RMA (Relationship Management Application) operators and messaging operators. The CSCF Control "6.1 Security Awareness" emphasizes the separation of duties, ensuring that operational roles like messaging operators do not overlap with administrative roles.

•Option C: Can approve the Customer Security Officer change requests

This is incorrect. Approving Customer Security Officer (CSO) change requests is a high-level administrative task that falls under the purview of SWIFT’s security and compliance processes, often involving SWIFT’s support team or a designated administrator within the institution. In Alliance Lite2, this responsibility does not lie with the messaging operator, whose role is focused on message handling. The CSCF mandates strict controls for CSO changes, typically requiring multi-party approval outside the messaging operator’s scope.

•Option D: Can approve messages

This is correct. In Alliance Lite2, messaging operators can approve messages as part of the workflow, depending on the institution’s configuration. For example, a message created by one operator may require approval by another operator (or the same operator if configured with dual roles) before it is sent to the SWIFT network. This approval process ensures accuracy and compliance with internal controls, a feature supported by the L2BA interface in Alliance Lite2. SWIFT documentation highlights this capability as part of the messaging workflow.

Summary of Correct Answers:

The messaging operator in Alliance Lite2 can create and modify messages (A) and can approve messages (D), consistent with their operational role.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024: Control 6.1 emphasizes role separation, limiting messaging operators to message-related tasks.

•SWIFT Alliance Lite2 Documentation: Details the messaging operator’s role in creating, modifying, and approving messages via L2BA.

•SWIFT Security Guidelines: Highlights administrative roles for RBAC and CSO changes, excluding messaging operators.

The "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines" and "Independent Assessment Framework" provide guidance on using external audit reports (e.g., ISAE 3000) to support CSP assessments. ISAE 3000 is an international standard for assurance engagements. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: No, that is too old, the maximum is 18 months

This is correct. The CSP specifies that external reports like ISAE 3000 must be no older than 18 months to ensure relevance, as security environments can change. The "Independent Assessment Framework" and "CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025" set this time limit to validate current compliance status.

•Option B: Yes, there is no time limit for an ISAE 3000 report

This is incorrect. A time limit is enforced to ensure the report reflects the current security posture, as per CSP guidelines.

•Option C: No, an ISAE 3000 report is no valid substitute as a rule

This is incorrect. An ISAE 3000 report can be used as supporting evidence if relevant and recent, but it is not a full substitute for the independent assessment, per the "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines."

•Option D: Yes, provided there is no change to the SWIFT user’s infrastructure

This is incorrect. Even with no changes, the 18-month limit applies to ensure the report’s currency, not just infrastructure stability.

Summary of Correct Answer:

An assessor cannot rely on an ISAE 3000 report dating back 2 years; the maximum is 18 months (A).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines: Limits ISAE 3000 reports to 18 months.

•Independent Assessment Framework: Specifies timeframe for external evidence.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Enforces currency of supporting reports.

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The "SWIFT footprint" refers to the extent of SWIFT-related infrastructure (hardware, software, and connectivity components) that a user must manage within their environment. A smaller footprint means less local infrastructure to maintain, typically achieved through cloud-based or managed services. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: Full stack of products up to the Messaging Interface

This refers to an on-premises deployment where the user manages a complete set of SWIFT components, including the messaging interface (e.g., Alliance Access), communication interface (e.g., Alliance Gateway), SwiftNet Link (SNL), HSM, and VPN boxes for connectivity to the SWIFT network. This setup requires significant local infrastructure, including servers, security devices, and network components, resulting in a large SWIFT footprint.

•Option B: Alliance Remote Gateway

Alliance Remote Gateway (ARG) is a service where the Alliance Gateway is hosted remotely by SWIFT or a third party, but the user still maintains a messaging interface (e.g., Alliance Access) locally. While this reduces the footprint slightly by outsourcing the communication interface, the user still manages the messaging interface, HSM, and local connectivity components, resulting in a moderate footprint.

•Option C: Lite 2 or Alliance Cloud

This is the correct answer. Alliance Lite2 and Alliance Cloud are cloud-based solutions designed for smaller institutions or those seeking a minimal local footprint. In Alliance Lite2, the user connects to SWIFT via a lightweight client (Alliance Lite2 AutoClient) or a browser-based interface, with most infrastructure (e.g., messaging interface, communication interface, HSM) hosted by SWIFT in the cloud. Alliance Cloud similarly hosts the full SWIFT stack (including Alliance Access and Alliance Gateway) in a SWIFT-managed cloud environment, requiring only minimal local infrastructure (e.g., a secure connection to the cloud). This results in the smallest SWIFT footprint, as the user manages very little on-premises infrastructure. The CSCF still applies, but many controls are managed by SWIFT (e.g., "1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection").

•Option D: A user with a Messaging Interface behind a Service Bureau

A Service Bureau is a third-party provider that hosts SWIFT infrastructure (e.g., Alliance Gateway, SNL) for multiple users, but the user still maintains a local messaging interface (e.g., Alliance Access) to connect to the Service Bureau. This setup reduces the footprint compared to a full on-premises deployment, as the user does not manage the communication interface or network connectivity components. However, the local messaging interface and associated security components (e.g., HSM) still constitute a larger footprint than a fully cloud-based solution like Alliance Lite2 or Alliance Cloud.

Summary of Correct Answer:

Alliance Lite2 or Alliance Cloud (C) has the smallest SWIFT footprint, as most infrastructure is hosted in the cloud by SWIFT, minimizing the user’s local management responsibilities.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024: Control 1.1 applies to cloud deployments like Alliance Cloud, reducing the user’s local footprint.

•SWIFT Alliance Lite2 Documentation: Describes the minimal infrastructure required for Lite2 users.

•SWIFT Alliance Cloud Documentation: Highlights the fully hosted nature of the solution, minimizing the SWIFT footprint.

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This question identifies the key components of Alliance Lite2 under theSwift Customer Security Programme (CSP).

Step 1: Understand Alliance Lite2 Components

Alliance Lite2 is a browser-based Swift solution for smaller institutions, with a simplified architecture. Its components are detailed in theSwift Alliance Lite2 User Guideand referenced in theCSCF v2024context.

Step 2: Evaluate Each Option

A. A web interfaceThe web interface is the primary user access point for Alliance Lite2, enabling message sending and receiving via a browser. This is a core component, as confirmed in theSwift Alliance Lite2 User Guide.Conclusion: Correct.

B. An AutoClientThe AutoClient is an optional automated client for batch processing and integration with back-office systems, considered a key component for enhanced functionality, per theSwift Alliance Lite2 Technical Documentation.Conclusion: Correct.

C. A HSM boxWhile HSMs are used for cryptographic security in Swift environments, Alliance Lite2 relies on Swift-managed HSM infrastructure, not user-managed HSM boxes. It is not a key user-side component, per theSwift Security Best Practices.Conclusion: Incorrect.

D. A WebSphere MQ ServerWebSphere MQ is a middleware solution not integral to Alliance Lite2, which uses a lightweight architecture without requiring such servers. TheSwift Alliance Lite2 User Guidedoes not list it as a component.Conclusion: Incorrect.

Step 3: Conclusion and Verification

The correct answers areAandB, as the web interface and AutoClient are the key user-side components of Alliance Lite2, consistent with theSwift Alliance Lite2 User GuideandCSCF v2024.

References

Swift Alliance Lite2 User Guide, Section: System Components.

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 1.1: Swift Environment Protection.

Swift Alliance Lite2 Technical Documentation, Section: Architecture.

The "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines" mandates record-keeping for CSP assessments. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: To support quality review (audit) processes

This applies. Minutes are required to facilitate quality reviews or audits by SWIFT or third parties, ensuring assessment integrity, as per the guidelines.

•Option B: For documentation purpose

This applies. Documentation is a core requirement to maintain a record of decisions and findings, supporting the "Swift_CSP_Assessment_Report_Template" and assessment traceability.

•Option C: To keep key information that can be used as input for the next step in the assessment process

This applies. Minutes capture critical details (e.g., scope changes) that inform subsequent assessment phases, aligning with the assessment workflow.

•Option D: To be uploaded in KYC-SA at the end of the assessment (mandated by SWIFT)

This does not apply. The KYC-SA portal requires the assessment report and completion letter, not meeting minutes, as per the "Independent Assessment Framework."

Summary of Correct Answers:

Minutes are kept to support quality reviews (A), for documentation (B), and as input for the next step (C).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines: Mandates minutes for these purposes.

•Independent Assessment Framework: Supports documentation and review.

•Swift_CSP_Assessment_Report_Template: Relies on documented records.

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The "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025" and "Independent Assessment Framework" define the scope of controls to be assessed based on the user’s architecture type (A1-A4). Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: Yes

This is incorrect. Not all controls (mandatory and advisory) must be assessed; only those applicable to the user’s architecture and attested to are required, per the "CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree."

•Option B: No, only the mandatory controls

This is incorrect. While mandatory controls must be assessed, users may also attest to advisory controls voluntarily, and these must be included in the assessment if attested, as per the "Assessment template for Mandatory controls" and "Assessment template for Advisory controls."

•Option C: No, only the attested controls (with as a minimum the mandatory ones according to the architecture type)

This is correct. The CSP requires assessment of all mandatory controls applicable to the user’s architecture type, plus any advisory controls the user chooses to attest to. The "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines" and "Swift_CSP_Assessment_Report_Template" confirm that the assessment focuses on attested controls, ensuring minimum mandatory coverage.

•Option D: No, the controls selection is agreed upfront between the SWIFT User and the assessor

This is incorrect. Control selection is not negotiable; it is determined by the architecture type and user attestation, not an ad-hoc agreement, as per the "CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree."

Summary of Correct Answer:

Only the attested controls, with a minimum of mandatory ones per architecture type, must be assessed (C).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Defines mandatory and advisory controls.

•Independent Assessment Framework: Focuses on attested controls.

•CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree: Guides control applicability.

This question examines the messaging capabilities of Alliance Lite2 under the Swift Customer Security Programme (CSP).

Step 1: Understand Alliance Lite2

Alliance Lite2 is a lightweight Swift solution designed for smaller financial institutions, providing access to Swift messaging services. Its capabilities are detailed in theSwift Alliance Lite2 User Guideand referenced in theCSCF v2024context.

Step 2: Analyze the Statement

The statement claims that Alliance Lite2 "only supports the sending and receiving of FIN messages." FIN messages are part of the FIN service for payment transactions, but Alliance Lite2’s scope extends beyond this.

Step 3: Evaluate Against Swift Guidelines

TheSwift Alliance Lite2 User Guidespecifies that Alliance Lite2 supports multiple message types, including:

FIN messages(e.g., MT103 for payments).

FileAct(for file transfers).

InterAct(for real-time messaging).

TheCSCF v2024does not restrict Alliance Lite2 to FIN messages; it applies security controls to all supported services. TheSwift CSP FAQconfirms that Alliance Lite2 users must comply with controls for all active services, not just FIN.

Thus, the statement that it "only supports" FIN messages is false, as it also supports FileAct and InterAct.

Step 4: Conclusion and Verification

The answer isB, as Alliance Lite2 supports more than just FIN messages, including FileAct and InterAct, per theSwift Alliance Lite2 User GuideandCSCF v2024.

References

Swift Alliance Lite2 User Guide, Section: Supported Services.

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 1.1: Swift Environment Protection.

Swift CSP FAQ, Section: Alliance Lite2 Scope.

The "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines" and "Independent Assessment Framework" outline conditions for relying on previous assessments. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: The control compliance conclusion must have already been relied on the past two years

This does not apply. There is no requirement that reliance has been used for two prior years; reliance is assessed annually based on current conditions, per the "Independent Assessment Framework."

•Option B: The previous assessment was performed on the CSCF version of the previous year (at least)

This does not apply. The CSCF version must match the current assessment year (e.g., v2025 for a 2025 assessment), not the previous year, to ensure alignment with updated controls, as per the "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025."

•Option C: The control definition has not changed

This applies. Reliance is permitted only if the control’s definition remains unchanged from the previous assessment, ensuring the prior conclusion remains relevant, as noted in the "CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025."

•Option D: The control design and implementation are the same

This applies. The assessor must confirm that the control’s design and implementation have not changed since the last assessment, as required by the "Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines" to validate ongoing compliance.

Summary of Correct Answers:

Reliance is allowed if the control definition has not changed (C) and the control design and implementation are the same (D).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines: Lists conditions for reliance.

•Independent Assessment Framework: Requires unchanged definitions and designs.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Supports reliance criteria.

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This question examines the applicability of internet access restrictions under theSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024.

Step 1: Understand Internet Access Restrictions

Control 2.6: Internet Accessibility Restrictionof theCSCF v2024requires restricting internet access for Swift-related components to minimize exposure, applicable to both secure zones and other in-scope systems.

Step 2: Analyze the Statement

The question asks if the restriction is only relevant when Swift-related components are in a secure zone, implying a scope limitation.

Step 3: Evaluate Each Option

A. Yes, because if there is no secure zone then the internet connectivity does not need to be restrictedIncorrect.Control 2.6applies to all in-scope components, not just those in secure zones. For example, operator PCs accessing hosted applications (e.g., via A3 architecture) must have restricted internet access, per theSwift Security Best Practices.Conclusion: Incorrect.

B. No, because there can be in-scope general operator PCs used to access a Swift-related application hosted at a service providerCorrect. General operator PCs (e.g., Component B in the diagram) are in scope when accessing Swift applications (e.g., hosted by a service provider in A3 architecture).Control 2.6requires internet restriction for these systems, even outside a secure zone, as confirmed in theCSCF v2024andSwift Outsourcing Guidelines.Conclusion: Correct.

Step 4: Conclusion and Verification

The correct answer isB, asControl 2.6mandates internet access restrictions for all in-scope components, including operator PCs accessing hosted Swift applications, not just those in secure zones.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 2.6: Internet Accessibility Restriction.

Swift Security Best Practices, Section: Internet Access Controls.

Swift Outsourcing Guidelines, Section: Operator PC Security.

The Local Security Officer (LSO) and Remote Security Officer (RSO) are roles defined within the SWIFT Alliance suite, particularly for managing security in messaging interfaces like Alliance Access. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: They are Alliance Security Officers

This is correct. The LSO and RSO are collectively referred to as Alliance Security Officers within the SWIFT ecosystem. The LSO is typically an on-site officer responsible for local security management, while the RSO can perform similar functions remotely, often for distributed environments. These roles are critical for configuring and maintaining security settings in Alliance Access, as outlined in SWIFT’s operational documentation. The CSCF Control "6.1 Security Awareness" emphasizes the importance of trained security officers, which aligns with the LSO/RSO roles.

•Option B: Their PKI certificates are stored either on an HSM Token or on an HSM-box

This is incorrect. While PKI certificates are used for authentication and are managed within the SWIFT environment, they are not specifically tied to the LSO or RSO roles in terms of storage. PKI certificates for SWIFTNet are stored and managed by the Hardware Security Module (HSM), either as an HSM token (e.g., a smart card) or an HSM-box (e.g., a physical or virtual HSM device). However, these certificates are associated with the SWIFT application or user roles (e.g., for message signing), not the LSO/RSO profiles themselves. The LSO/RSO uses these certificates as part of their duties, but the statement implies ownership or storage, which is inaccurate. CSCF Control "1.3 Cryptographic Failover" specifies HSM management, not LSO/RSO certificate storage.

•Option C: They are the business profiles that can sign the SWIFT financial transactions

This is incorrect. The LSO and RSO are security management roles, not business profiles authorized to sign financial transactions. Signing SWIFT financial transactions (e.g., MT103 messages) is the responsibility of authorized business users or automated processes within Alliance Access, who use PKI certificates managed by the HSM. The LSO/RSO’s role is to configure and oversee security, not to perform transactional activities. This distinction is clear in SWIFT’s role-based access control documentation.

•Option D: They are responsible for the configuration and management of the security functions in the messaging interface

This is correct. The LSO and RSO are tasked with configuring and managing security functions within Alliance Access, such as user access control, authentication settings, and compliance with CSCF requirements. This includes managing PKI certificate usage, setting up secure communication channels, and ensuring the messaging interface adheres to security policies. For example, the LSO can define security profiles and monitor access, as detailed in the Alliance Access Administration Guide, aligning with CSCF Control "2.1 Internal Data Transmission Security."

Summary of Correct Answers:

The LSO and RSO are Alliance Security Officers (A) and are responsible for the configuration and management of security functions in the messaging interface (D). Their PKI certificates are not stored by them, and they do not sign transactions.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024: Control 6.1 highlights the role of security officers like LSO/RSO.

•SWIFT Alliance Access Documentation: Describes LSO/RSO responsibilities for security configuration.

•SWIFT Security Guidelines: Details PKI certificate management by HSM, not LSO/RSO.

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The SWIFT CSP defines architecture types (A1 to A4) based on the components a user owns and manages, as outlined in the "CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree" and "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025." These types determine the applicable security controls and assessment requirements. Let’s analyze the scenario and options:

•A customer connector is a component (e.g., a custom application or integration layer) that connects to SWIFT services, such as through the SWIFT API or a messaging interface. It handles data flows but is not a standard SWIFT-provided interface.

•A communication interface refers to a component like Alliance Gateway (SAG), which manages connectivity to the SWIFT network via SwiftNet Link (SNL) and VPN boxes.

•The architecture types are:

oA1: Full stack (owns messaging interface, communication interface, and network components, e.g., Alliance Access, Alliance Gateway, VPN boxes).

oA2: Owns a customer connector and communication interface, with the messaging interface hosted elsewhere (e.g., by a service bureau or SWIFT).

oA3: Owns only a customer connector, relying on external communication and messaging interfaces.

oA4: Uses a fully hosted solution (e.g., Alliance Cloud or Lite2), owning no local components.

•In this case, the user owns a customer connector and a communication interface but does not mention owning a messaging interface (e.g., Alliance Access). This matches the A2 architecture type, where the user manages a custom integration (connector) and the communication layer (e.g., SAG), while the messaging interface is provided by another party (e.g., a service bureau or SWIFT-hosted environment). The "CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree" confirms this classification, and the "Assessment template for Mandatory controls" applies A2-specific requirements.

•Option A: A1

This is incorrect. A1 requires ownership of a messaging interface (e.g., Alliance Access), which is not mentioned.

•Option B: A2

This is correct. A2 fits the scenario of owning a customer connector and communication interface without a messaging interface.

•Option C: A3

This is incorrect. A3 involves only a customer connector, not a communication interface.

•Option D: A4

This is incorrect. A4 applies to fully hosted solutions with no local ownership of connectors or interfaces.

Summary of Correct Answer:

The SWIFT user with a customer connector and a communication interface is of architecture type A2 (B).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Defines architecture types A1-A4.

•CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree: Classifies A2 for customer connector and communication interface ownership.

•Assessment template for Mandatory controls: Applies to A2 architecture.

The "Independent Assessment Framework - High-Level Test Plan Guidelines" and "CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025" provide guidance on relying on previous assessments using a limited testing approach. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: There is no need for a sample for this limited testing

This is incorrect. Limited testing requires a sample to validate ongoing compliance, as per the guidelines.

•Option B: 1

This is incorrect. A sample size of 1 is insufficient to ensure statistical reliability for limited testing, per the HLTP guidelines.

•Option C: 3

This is correct. The "Independent Assessment Framework - High-Level Test Plan Guidelines" recommends a minimum sample size of 3 for each identified component when relying on previous assessments, allowing the assessor to confirm consistency and effectiveness without a full re-assessment.

•Option D: 5

This is incorrect. While a larger sample (e.g., 5) may be used in full assessments, the HLTP guidelines specify 3 as the minimum for limited testing.

Summary of Correct Answer:

The expected sample size is 3 for each identified component (C).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Independent Assessment Framework - High-Level Test Plan Guidelines: Specifies a sample size of 3.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Supports limited testing sample requirements.

•Independent Assessment Process for Assessors Guidelines: Guides reliance testing.

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